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CHAPTER ONE
The New World Order
Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values. In the seventeenth century, France under Cardinal Richelieu introduced the modern approach to international relations, based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its ultimate purpose. In the eighteenth century, Great Britain elaborated the concept of the balance of power, which dominated European diplomacy for the next 200 years. In the nineteenth century, Metternich's Austria reconstructed the Concert of Europe and Bismarck's Germany dismantled it, reshaping European diplomacy into a cold-blooded game of power politics.
In the twentieth century, no country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States. No society has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable. No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral convictions. No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope.
The singularities that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that America's values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world. Torn between nostalgia for a pristine past and yearning for a perfect future, American thought has oscillated between isolationism and commitment, though, since the end of the Second World War, the realities of interdependence have predominated.
Both schools of thought -- of America as beacon and of America as crusader -- envision as normal a global international order based on democracy, free commerce, and international law. Since no such system has ever existed, its evocation often appears to other societies as utopian, if not naïve. Still, foreign skepticism never dimmed the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, or Ronald Reagan, or indeed of all other twentieth-century American presidents. If anything, it has spurred America's faith that history can be overcome and that if the world truly wants peace, it needs to apply America's moral prescriptions.
Both schools of thought were products of the American experience. Though other republics have existed, none had been consciously created to vindicate the idea of liberty. No other country's population had chosen to head for a new continent and tame its wilderness in the name of freedom and prosperity for all. Thus the two approaches, the isolationist and the missionary, so contradictory on the surface, reflected a common underlying faith: that the United States possessed the world's best system of government, and that the rest of mankind could attain peace and prosperity by abandoning traditional diplomacy and adopting America's reverence for international law and democracy.
America's journey through international politics has been a triumph of faith over experience. Since the time America entered the arena of world politics in 1917, it has been so preponderant in strength and so convinced of the rightness of its ideals that this century's major international agreements have been embodiments of American values -- from the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The collapse of Soviet communism marked the intellectual vindication of American ideals and, ironically, brought America face to face with the kind of world it had been seeking to escape throughout its history. In the emerging international order, nationalism has gained a new lease on life. Nations have pursued self-interest more frequently than high-minded principle, and have competed more than they have cooperated. There is little evidence to suggest that this age-old mode of behavior has changed, or that it is likely to change in the decades ahead.
What is new about the emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it. America cannot change the way it has perceived its role throughout its history, not should it want to. When America entered the international arena, it was young and robust and had the power to make the world conform to its vision of international relations. By the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States was so powerful (at one point about 35 percent of the world's entire economic production was American) that it seemed as if it was destined to shape the world according to its preferences.
John F. Kennedy declared confidently in 1961 that America was strong enough to 'pay any price, bear any burden' to ensure the success of liberty. Three decades later, the United States is in less of a position to insist on the immediate realization of all its desires. Other countries have grown into Great Power status. The United States now faces the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an amalgam of American values and geopolitical necessities. One of the new necessities is that a world comprising several states of comparable strength must base its order on some concept of equilibrium -- an idea with which the United States has never felt comfortable.
When American thinking on foreign policy and European diplomatic traditions encountered each other at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the differences in historical experience became dramatically evident. The European leaders sought to refurbish the existing system according to familiar methods; the American peacemakers believed that the Great War had resulted not from intractable geopolitical conflicts hut from flawed European practices. In his famous Fourteen Points, Woodrow Wilson told the Europeans that, henceforth, the international system should be based not on the balance of power but on ethnic self-determination, that their security should depend not on military alliances but on collective security, and that their diplomacy should no longer be conducted secretly by experts but on the basis of 'open agreements, openly arrived at.' Clearly, Wilson had come not so much to discuss the terms for ending a war or for restoring the existing international order, as he had to recast a whole system of international relations as it had been practiced for nearly three centuries.
For as long as Americans have been reflecting on foreign policy, they have ascribed Europe's travails to the balance-of-power system. And since the time Europe first had to concern itself with American foreign policy, its leaders have looked askance at America's self-appointed mission of global reform. Each side has behaved as if the other had freely chosen its mode of diplomatic behavior and could have, were it wiser or less bellicose, selected some other, more agreeable, method.
In fact, both the American and the European approaches to foreign policy were the products of their own unique circumstances. Americans inhabited a nearly empty continent shielded from predatory powers by two vast oceans and with weak countries as neighbors. Since America confronted no power in need of being balanced, it could hardly have occupied itself with the challenges of equilibrium even if its leaders had been seized by the bizarre notion of replicating European conditions amidst a people who had turned their backs on Europe.
The anguishing dilemmas of security that tormented European nations did not touch America for nearly 150 years. When they did, America twice participated in the world wars which had been started by the nations of Europe. In each instance, by the time America got involved, the balance of power had already failed to operate, producing this paradox: that the balance of power, which most Americans disdained, in fact assured American security as long as it functioned as it was designed; and that it was its breakdown that drew America into international politics.
The nations of Europe did not choose the balance of power as the means for regulating their relations out of innate quarrelsomeness or an Old World love of intrigue. If the emphasis on democracy and international law was the product of America's unique sense of security, European diplomacy had been forged in the school of hard knocks.
Europe was thrown into balance-of-power politics when its first choice, the medieval dream of universal empire, collapsed and a host of stares of more or less equal strength arose from the ashes of that ancient aspiration. When a group of states so constituted are obliged to deal with one another, there are only two possible outcomes: either one state becomes so strong that it dominates all the others and creates an empire, or no stare is ever quite powerful enough to achieve that goal. In the latter case, the pretensions of the most aggressive member of the international community are kept in check by a combination of the others; in other words, by the operation of a balance of power.
The balance-of-power system did not purport to avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and moderation. By definition, a balance-of-power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order.
Theorists of the balance of power often leave the impression that it is the natural form of international relations. In fact, balance-of-power systems have existed only rarely in human history. The Western Hemisphere has never known one, nor has the territory of contemporary China since the end of the period of the warring states, over 2,000 years ago. For the greatest part of humanity and the longest periods of history, empire has been the typical mode of government. Empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system. Empires have no need for a balance of power. That is how the United States has conducted its foreign policy in the Americas, and China through most of its history in Asia.
In the West, the only examples of functioning balance-of-power systems were among the city-states of ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy, and the European state system which arose out of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The distinguishing feature of these systems was to elevate a fact of life -- the existence of a number of states of substantially equal strength -- into a guiding principle of world order.
Intellectually, the concept of the balance of power reflected the convictions of all the major political thinkers of the Enlightenment. In their view, the universe, including the political sphere, operated according to rational principles which balanced each other. Seemingly random acts by reasonable men would, in their totality, tend toward the common good, though the proof of this proposition was elusive in the century of almost constant conflict that followed the Thirty Years' War.
Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, maintained that an 'invisible hand' would distill general economic well-being out of selfish individual economic actions. In The Federalist Papers, Madison argued that, in a large enough republic, the various political 'factions' selfishly pursuing their own interests would, by a kind of automatic mechanism, forge a proper domestic harmony. The concepts of the separation of powers and of checks and balances, as conceived by Montesquieu and embodied in the American Constitution, reflected an identical view. The purpose of the separation of powers was to avoid despotism, not to achieve harmonious government; each branch of the government, in the pursuit of its own interests, would restrain excess and thereby serve the common good. The same principles were applied to international affairs. By pursuing its own selfish interests, each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state assured well-being for all.
For over a century, this expectation seemed to be fulfilled. After the dislocations caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe restored the balance of power at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and softened the brutal reliance on power by seeking to moderate international conduct through moral and legal bonds. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, the European balance-of-power system returned to the principles of power politics and in a far more unforgiving environment. Facing down the adversary became the standard method of diplomacy, leading to one test of strength after another. Finally, in 1914, a crisis arose from which no one shrank. Europe never fully recovered world leadership after the catastrophe of the First World War. The United States emerged as the dominant player but Woodrow Wilson soon made it clear that his country refused to play by European rules.
At no time in its history has America participated in a balance-of-power system. Before the two world wars, America benefited from the operation of the balance of power without being involved in its maneuvers, and while enjoying the luxury of castigating it at will. During the Cold War, America was engaged in an ideological, political, and strategic struggle with the Soviet Union in which a two-power world operated according to principles quite different from those of a balance-of-power system. In a two-power world, there can be no pretense that conflict leads to the common good; any gain for one side is a loss for the other. Victory without war was in fact what America achieved in the Cold War, a victory which has now obliged it to confront the dilemma described by George Bernard Shaw: 'There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The other is to gain it.'
American leaders have taken their values so much for granted that they rarely recognize how revolutionary and unsettling these values can appear to others. No other society has asserted that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the same way that they do to the individual -- a notion that is the exact opposite of Richelieu's raison d'état. America has maintained that the prevention of war is as much a legal as a diplomatic challenge, and that what it resists is not change as such hut the method of change, especially the use of force. A Bismarck or a Disraeli would have ridiculed the proposition that foreign policy is about method rather than substance, if indeed he had understood it. No nation has ever imposed the moral demands on itself that America has. And no country has so tormented itself over the gap between its moral values, which are by definition absolute, and the imperfection inherent in the concrete situations to which they must be applied.
During the Cold War, the unique American approach to foreign policy was remarkably appropriate to the challenge at hand. There was a deep ideological conflict, and only one country, the United States, possessed the full panoply of means -- political, economic, and military -- to organize the defense of the noncommunist world. A nation in such a position is able to insist on its views and can often avoid the problem facing the statesmen of less favored societies: that their means oblige them to pursue goals less ambitious than their hopes, and that their circumstances require them to approach even those goals in stages.
In the Cold War world, the traditional concepts of power had substantially broken down. Most of history has displayed a synthesis of military, political, and economic strength, which in general has proved to be symmetrical. In the Cold War period, the various elements of power became quite distinct. The former Soviet Union was a military superpower and at the same time an economic dwarf. It was also possible for a country to be an economic giant hut to be militarily irrelevant, as was the case with Japan.
In the post-Cold War world, the various elements are likely to grow more congruent and more symmetrical. The relative military power of the United States will gradually decline. The absence of a clear-cut adversary will produce domestic pressure to shift resources from defense to other priorities -- a process which has already started. When there is no longer a single threat and each country perceives its perils from its own national perspective, those societies which had nestled under American protection will feel compelled to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Thus, the operation of the new international system will move toward equilibrium even in the military field, though it may take some decades to reach that point. These tendencies will be even more pronounced in economics, where American predominance is already declining, and where it has become safer to challenge the United States.
The international system of the twenty-first century will be marked by a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other, growing globalization. On the level of the relations among states, the new order will be more like the European state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the Cold War. It will contain at least six major powers -- the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India -- as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries. At the same time, international relations have become truly global for the first time. Communications are instantaneous; the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously. A whole set of issues has surfaced that can only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, the population explosion, and economic interdependence.
For America, reconciling differing values and very different historical experiences among countries of comparable significance will be a novel experience and a major departure from either the isolation of the last century or the de facto hegemony of the Cold War, in ways which this book seeks to illuminate. Equally, the other major players are facing difficulties in adjusting to the emerging world order.
Europe, the only part of the modern world ever to operate a multistate system, invented the concepts of the nation-state, sovereignty, and the balance of power. These ideas dominated international affairs for the better part of three centuries. But none of Europe's erstwhile practitioners of raison d'état are now strong enough to act as principals in the emerging international order. They are attempting to compensate for this relative weakness by creating a unified Europe, an effort which absorbs much of their energies. But even if they were to succeed, no automatic guidelines for the conduct of a unified Europe on the global stage would be at hand, since such a political entity has never existed before.
Throughout its history, Russia has been a special case. It arrived late on the European scene -- well after France and Great Britain had been consolidated -- and none of the traditional principles of European diplomacy seemed to apply to it. Bordering on three different cultural spheres -- Europe, Asia, and the Muslim world -- Russia contained populations of each, and hence was never a national state in the European sense. Constantly changing shape as its rulers annexed contiguous territories, Russia was an empire out of scale in comparison with any of the European countries. Moreover, with every new conquest, the character of the state changed as it incorporated another brand-new, restive, non-Russian ethnic group. This was one of the reasons Russia felt obliged to maintain huge armies whose size was unrelated to any plausible threat to its external security.
Torn between obsessive insecurity and proselytizing zeal, between the requirements of Europe and the temptations of Asia, the Russian Empire always had a role in the European equilibrium but was never emotionally a part of it. The requirements of conquest and of security became merged in the minds of Russian leaders. Since the Congress of Vienna, the Russian Empire has placed its military forces on foreign soil more often than any other major power. Analysts frequently explain Russian expansionism as stemming from a sense of insecurity. But Russian writers have far more often justified Russia's outward thrust as a messianic vocation. Russia on the march rarely showed a sense of limits; thwarted, it tended to withdraw into sullen resentment. For most of its history, Russia has been a cause looking for opportunity.
Postcommunist Russia finds itself within borders which reflect no historical precedent. Like Europe, it will have to devote much of its energy to redefining its identity. Will it seek to return to its historical rhythm and restore the lost empire? Will it shift its center of gravity eastward and become a more active participant in Asian diplomacy? By what principles and methods will it react to the upheavals around its borders, especially in the volatile Middle East? Russia will always be essential to world order and, in the inevitable turmoil associated with answering these questions, a potential menace to it.
China too faces a world order that is new to it. For 2,000 years, the Chinese Empire had united its world under a single imperial rule. To be sure, that rule had faltered at times. Wars occurred in China no less frequently than they did in Europe. But since they generally took place among contenders for the imperial authority, they were more in the nature of civil rather than international wars, and, sooner or later, invariably led to the emergence of some new central power.
Before the nineteenth century, China never had a neighbor capable of contesting its pre-eminence and never imagined that such a state could arise. Conquerors from abroad overthrew Chinese dynasties, only to be absorbed into Chinese culture to such an extent that they continued the traditions of the Middle Kingdom. The notion of the sovereign equality of states did not exist in China; outsiders were considered barbarians and were relegated to a tributary relationship -- that was how the first British envoy to Beijing was received in the eighteenth century. China disdained sending ambassadors abroad but was not above using distant barbarians to overcome the ones nearby. Yet this was a strategy for emergencies, not a day-to-day operational system like the European balance of power, and it failed to produce the sort of permanent diplomatic establishment characteristic of Europe. After China became a humiliated subject of European colonialism in the nineteenth century, it re-emerged only recently -- since the Second World War -- into a multipolar world unprecedented in its history.
Japan had also cut itself off from all contact with the outside world. For 500 years before it was forcibly opened by Commodore Matthew Perry in 1854, Japan did not even deign to balance the barbarians off against each other or to invent tributary relationships, as the Chinese had. Closed off from the outside world, Japan prided itself on its unique customs, gratified its military tradition by civil war, and rested its internal structure on the conviction that its unique culture was impervious to foreign influence, superior to it, and, in the end, would defeat it rather than absorb it.
In the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was the dominant security threat, Japan was able to identify its foreign policy with America, thousands of miles away. The new world order, with its multiplicity of challenges, will almost certainly oblige a country with so proud a past to re-examine its reliance on a single ally. Japan is bound to become more sensitive to the Asian balance of power than is possible for America, in a different hemisphere and facing in three directions -- across the Atlantic, across the Pacific, and toward South America. China, Korea, and Southeast Asia will acquire quite a different significance for Japan than for the United States, and will inaugurate a more autonomous and more self-reliant Japanese foreign policy.
As for India, which is now emerging as the major power in South Asia, its foreign policy is in many ways the last vestige of the heyday of European imperialism, leavened by the traditions of an ancient culture. Before the arrival of the British, the subcontinent had not been ruled as a single political unit for millennia. British colonization was accomplished with small military forces because, at first, the local population saw these as the replacement of one set of conquerors by another. But after it established unified rule, the British Empire was undermined by the very values of popular government and cultural nationalism it had imported into India. Yet, as a nation-state, India is a newcomer. Absorbed by the struggle to feed its vast population, India dabbled in the Nonaligned movement during the Cold War. But it has yet to assume a role commensurate with its size on the international political stage.
Thus, in effect, none of the most important countries which must build a new world order have had any experience with the multistate system that is emerging. Never before has a new world order had to be assembled from so many different perceptions, or on so global a scale. Nor has any previous order had to combine the attributes of the historic balance-of-power systems with global democratic opinion and the exploding technology of the contemporary period.
In retrospect, all international systems appear to have an inevitable symmetry. Once they are established, it is difficult to imagine how history might have evolved had other choices been made, or indeed whether any other choices had been possible. When an international order first comes into being, many choices may be open to it. But each choice constricts the universe of remaining options. Because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices are especially crucial. Whether an international order is relatively stable, like the one that emerged from the Congress of Vienna, or highly volatile, like those that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia and the Treaty of Versailles, depends on the degree to which they reconcile what makes the constituent societies feel secure with what they consider just.
The two international systems that were the most stable -- that of the Congress of Vienna and the one dominated by the United States after the Second World War -- had the advantage of uniform perceptions. The statesmen at Vienna were aristocrats who saw intangibles in the same way, and agreed on fundamentals; the American leaders who shaped the postwar world emerged from an intellectual tradition of extraordinary coherence and vitality.
The order that is now emerging will have to be built by statesmen who represent vastly different cultures. They tun huge bureaucracies of such complexity that, often, the energy of these statesmen is more consumed by serving the administrative machinery than by defining a purpose. They rise to eminence by means of qualities that are not necessarily those needed to govern, and are even less suited to building an international order. And the only available model of a multistate system was one built by Western societies, which many of the participants may reject.
Yet the rise and fall of previous world orders based on many states -- from the Peace of Westphalia to out time -- is the only experience on which one can draw in trying to understand the challenges facing contemporary statesmen. The study of history offers no manual of instructions that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations. But each generation must determine for itself which circumstances are in fact comparable.
Intellectuals analyze the operations of international systems; statesmen build them. And there is a vast difference between the perspective of an analyst and that of a statesman. The analyst can choose which problem he wishes to study, whereas the statesman's problems are imposed on him. The analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the overwhelming challenge to the statesman is the pressure of time. The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable. The analyst has available to him all the facts; he will be judged on his intellectual power. The statesman must act on assessments that cannot be proved at the time that he is making them; he will be judged by history on the basis of how wisely he managed the inevitable change and, above all, by how well he preserves the peace. That is why examining how statesmen have dealt with the problem of world order -- what worked or failed and why -- is not the end of understanding contemporary diplomacy, though it may be its beginning.
Copyright © 1994 by Henry A. Kissinger
The New World Order
Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values. In the seventeenth century, France under Cardinal Richelieu introduced the modern approach to international relations, based on the nation-state and motivated by national interest as its ultimate purpose. In the eighteenth century, Great Britain elaborated the concept of the balance of power, which dominated European diplomacy for the next 200 years. In the nineteenth century, Metternich's Austria reconstructed the Concert of Europe and Bismarck's Germany dismantled it, reshaping European diplomacy into a cold-blooded game of power politics.
In the twentieth century, no country has influenced international relations as decisively and at the same time as ambivalently as the United States. No society has more firmly insisted on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, or more passionately asserted that its own values were universally applicable. No nation has been more pragmatic in the day-to-day conduct of its diplomacy, or more ideological in the pursuit of its historic moral convictions. No country has been more reluctant to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope.
The singularities that America has ascribed to itself throughout its history have produced two contradictory attitudes toward foreign policy. The first is that America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind; the second, that America's values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world. Torn between nostalgia for a pristine past and yearning for a perfect future, American thought has oscillated between isolationism and commitment, though, since the end of the Second World War, the realities of interdependence have predominated.
Both schools of thought -- of America as beacon and of America as crusader -- envision as normal a global international order based on democracy, free commerce, and international law. Since no such system has ever existed, its evocation often appears to other societies as utopian, if not naïve. Still, foreign skepticism never dimmed the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, or Ronald Reagan, or indeed of all other twentieth-century American presidents. If anything, it has spurred America's faith that history can be overcome and that if the world truly wants peace, it needs to apply America's moral prescriptions.
Both schools of thought were products of the American experience. Though other republics have existed, none had been consciously created to vindicate the idea of liberty. No other country's population had chosen to head for a new continent and tame its wilderness in the name of freedom and prosperity for all. Thus the two approaches, the isolationist and the missionary, so contradictory on the surface, reflected a common underlying faith: that the United States possessed the world's best system of government, and that the rest of mankind could attain peace and prosperity by abandoning traditional diplomacy and adopting America's reverence for international law and democracy.
America's journey through international politics has been a triumph of faith over experience. Since the time America entered the arena of world politics in 1917, it has been so preponderant in strength and so convinced of the rightness of its ideals that this century's major international agreements have been embodiments of American values -- from the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact to the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. The collapse of Soviet communism marked the intellectual vindication of American ideals and, ironically, brought America face to face with the kind of world it had been seeking to escape throughout its history. In the emerging international order, nationalism has gained a new lease on life. Nations have pursued self-interest more frequently than high-minded principle, and have competed more than they have cooperated. There is little evidence to suggest that this age-old mode of behavior has changed, or that it is likely to change in the decades ahead.
What is new about the emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it. America cannot change the way it has perceived its role throughout its history, not should it want to. When America entered the international arena, it was young and robust and had the power to make the world conform to its vision of international relations. By the end of the Second World War in 1945, the United States was so powerful (at one point about 35 percent of the world's entire economic production was American) that it seemed as if it was destined to shape the world according to its preferences.
John F. Kennedy declared confidently in 1961 that America was strong enough to 'pay any price, bear any burden' to ensure the success of liberty. Three decades later, the United States is in less of a position to insist on the immediate realization of all its desires. Other countries have grown into Great Power status. The United States now faces the challenge of reaching its goals in stages, each of which is an amalgam of American values and geopolitical necessities. One of the new necessities is that a world comprising several states of comparable strength must base its order on some concept of equilibrium -- an idea with which the United States has never felt comfortable.
When American thinking on foreign policy and European diplomatic traditions encountered each other at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the differences in historical experience became dramatically evident. The European leaders sought to refurbish the existing system according to familiar methods; the American peacemakers believed that the Great War had resulted not from intractable geopolitical conflicts hut from flawed European practices. In his famous Fourteen Points, Woodrow Wilson told the Europeans that, henceforth, the international system should be based not on the balance of power but on ethnic self-determination, that their security should depend not on military alliances but on collective security, and that their diplomacy should no longer be conducted secretly by experts but on the basis of 'open agreements, openly arrived at.' Clearly, Wilson had come not so much to discuss the terms for ending a war or for restoring the existing international order, as he had to recast a whole system of international relations as it had been practiced for nearly three centuries.
For as long as Americans have been reflecting on foreign policy, they have ascribed Europe's travails to the balance-of-power system. And since the time Europe first had to concern itself with American foreign policy, its leaders have looked askance at America's self-appointed mission of global reform. Each side has behaved as if the other had freely chosen its mode of diplomatic behavior and could have, were it wiser or less bellicose, selected some other, more agreeable, method.
In fact, both the American and the European approaches to foreign policy were the products of their own unique circumstances. Americans inhabited a nearly empty continent shielded from predatory powers by two vast oceans and with weak countries as neighbors. Since America confronted no power in need of being balanced, it could hardly have occupied itself with the challenges of equilibrium even if its leaders had been seized by the bizarre notion of replicating European conditions amidst a people who had turned their backs on Europe.
The anguishing dilemmas of security that tormented European nations did not touch America for nearly 150 years. When they did, America twice participated in the world wars which had been started by the nations of Europe. In each instance, by the time America got involved, the balance of power had already failed to operate, producing this paradox: that the balance of power, which most Americans disdained, in fact assured American security as long as it functioned as it was designed; and that it was its breakdown that drew America into international politics.
The nations of Europe did not choose the balance of power as the means for regulating their relations out of innate quarrelsomeness or an Old World love of intrigue. If the emphasis on democracy and international law was the product of America's unique sense of security, European diplomacy had been forged in the school of hard knocks.
Europe was thrown into balance-of-power politics when its first choice, the medieval dream of universal empire, collapsed and a host of stares of more or less equal strength arose from the ashes of that ancient aspiration. When a group of states so constituted are obliged to deal with one another, there are only two possible outcomes: either one state becomes so strong that it dominates all the others and creates an empire, or no stare is ever quite powerful enough to achieve that goal. In the latter case, the pretensions of the most aggressive member of the international community are kept in check by a combination of the others; in other words, by the operation of a balance of power.
The balance-of-power system did not purport to avoid crises or even wars. When working properly, it was meant to limit both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and moderation. By definition, a balance-of-power arrangement cannot satisfy every member of the international system completely; it works best when it keeps dissatisfaction below the level at which the aggrieved party will seek to overthrow the international order.
Theorists of the balance of power often leave the impression that it is the natural form of international relations. In fact, balance-of-power systems have existed only rarely in human history. The Western Hemisphere has never known one, nor has the territory of contemporary China since the end of the period of the warring states, over 2,000 years ago. For the greatest part of humanity and the longest periods of history, empire has been the typical mode of government. Empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system. Empires have no need for a balance of power. That is how the United States has conducted its foreign policy in the Americas, and China through most of its history in Asia.
In the West, the only examples of functioning balance-of-power systems were among the city-states of ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy, and the European state system which arose out of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The distinguishing feature of these systems was to elevate a fact of life -- the existence of a number of states of substantially equal strength -- into a guiding principle of world order.
Intellectually, the concept of the balance of power reflected the convictions of all the major political thinkers of the Enlightenment. In their view, the universe, including the political sphere, operated according to rational principles which balanced each other. Seemingly random acts by reasonable men would, in their totality, tend toward the common good, though the proof of this proposition was elusive in the century of almost constant conflict that followed the Thirty Years' War.
Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, maintained that an 'invisible hand' would distill general economic well-being out of selfish individual economic actions. In The Federalist Papers, Madison argued that, in a large enough republic, the various political 'factions' selfishly pursuing their own interests would, by a kind of automatic mechanism, forge a proper domestic harmony. The concepts of the separation of powers and of checks and balances, as conceived by Montesquieu and embodied in the American Constitution, reflected an identical view. The purpose of the separation of powers was to avoid despotism, not to achieve harmonious government; each branch of the government, in the pursuit of its own interests, would restrain excess and thereby serve the common good. The same principles were applied to international affairs. By pursuing its own selfish interests, each state was presumed to contribute to progress, as if some unseen hand were guaranteeing that freedom of choice for each state assured well-being for all.
For over a century, this expectation seemed to be fulfilled. After the dislocations caused by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, the leaders of Europe restored the balance of power at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and softened the brutal reliance on power by seeking to moderate international conduct through moral and legal bonds. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, the European balance-of-power system returned to the principles of power politics and in a far more unforgiving environment. Facing down the adversary became the standard method of diplomacy, leading to one test of strength after another. Finally, in 1914, a crisis arose from which no one shrank. Europe never fully recovered world leadership after the catastrophe of the First World War. The United States emerged as the dominant player but Woodrow Wilson soon made it clear that his country refused to play by European rules.
At no time in its history has America participated in a balance-of-power system. Before the two world wars, America benefited from the operation of the balance of power without being involved in its maneuvers, and while enjoying the luxury of castigating it at will. During the Cold War, America was engaged in an ideological, political, and strategic struggle with the Soviet Union in which a two-power world operated according to principles quite different from those of a balance-of-power system. In a two-power world, there can be no pretense that conflict leads to the common good; any gain for one side is a loss for the other. Victory without war was in fact what America achieved in the Cold War, a victory which has now obliged it to confront the dilemma described by George Bernard Shaw: 'There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your heart's desire. The other is to gain it.'
American leaders have taken their values so much for granted that they rarely recognize how revolutionary and unsettling these values can appear to others. No other society has asserted that the principles of ethical conduct apply to international conduct in the same way that they do to the individual -- a notion that is the exact opposite of Richelieu's raison d'état. America has maintained that the prevention of war is as much a legal as a diplomatic challenge, and that what it resists is not change as such hut the method of change, especially the use of force. A Bismarck or a Disraeli would have ridiculed the proposition that foreign policy is about method rather than substance, if indeed he had understood it. No nation has ever imposed the moral demands on itself that America has. And no country has so tormented itself over the gap between its moral values, which are by definition absolute, and the imperfection inherent in the concrete situations to which they must be applied.
During the Cold War, the unique American approach to foreign policy was remarkably appropriate to the challenge at hand. There was a deep ideological conflict, and only one country, the United States, possessed the full panoply of means -- political, economic, and military -- to organize the defense of the noncommunist world. A nation in such a position is able to insist on its views and can often avoid the problem facing the statesmen of less favored societies: that their means oblige them to pursue goals less ambitious than their hopes, and that their circumstances require them to approach even those goals in stages.
In the Cold War world, the traditional concepts of power had substantially broken down. Most of history has displayed a synthesis of military, political, and economic strength, which in general has proved to be symmetrical. In the Cold War period, the various elements of power became quite distinct. The former Soviet Union was a military superpower and at the same time an economic dwarf. It was also possible for a country to be an economic giant hut to be militarily irrelevant, as was the case with Japan.
In the post-Cold War world, the various elements are likely to grow more congruent and more symmetrical. The relative military power of the United States will gradually decline. The absence of a clear-cut adversary will produce domestic pressure to shift resources from defense to other priorities -- a process which has already started. When there is no longer a single threat and each country perceives its perils from its own national perspective, those societies which had nestled under American protection will feel compelled to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Thus, the operation of the new international system will move toward equilibrium even in the military field, though it may take some decades to reach that point. These tendencies will be even more pronounced in economics, where American predominance is already declining, and where it has become safer to challenge the United States.
The international system of the twenty-first century will be marked by a seeming contradiction: on the one hand, fragmentation; on the other, growing globalization. On the level of the relations among states, the new order will be more like the European state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the Cold War. It will contain at least six major powers -- the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India -- as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries. At the same time, international relations have become truly global for the first time. Communications are instantaneous; the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously. A whole set of issues has surfaced that can only be dealt with on a worldwide basis, such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, the population explosion, and economic interdependence.
For America, reconciling differing values and very different historical experiences among countries of comparable significance will be a novel experience and a major departure from either the isolation of the last century or the de facto hegemony of the Cold War, in ways which this book seeks to illuminate. Equally, the other major players are facing difficulties in adjusting to the emerging world order.
Europe, the only part of the modern world ever to operate a multistate system, invented the concepts of the nation-state, sovereignty, and the balance of power. These ideas dominated international affairs for the better part of three centuries. But none of Europe's erstwhile practitioners of raison d'état are now strong enough to act as principals in the emerging international order. They are attempting to compensate for this relative weakness by creating a unified Europe, an effort which absorbs much of their energies. But even if they were to succeed, no automatic guidelines for the conduct of a unified Europe on the global stage would be at hand, since such a political entity has never existed before.
Throughout its history, Russia has been a special case. It arrived late on the European scene -- well after France and Great Britain had been consolidated -- and none of the traditional principles of European diplomacy seemed to apply to it. Bordering on three different cultural spheres -- Europe, Asia, and the Muslim world -- Russia contained populations of each, and hence was never a national state in the European sense. Constantly changing shape as its rulers annexed contiguous territories, Russia was an empire out of scale in comparison with any of the European countries. Moreover, with every new conquest, the character of the state changed as it incorporated another brand-new, restive, non-Russian ethnic group. This was one of the reasons Russia felt obliged to maintain huge armies whose size was unrelated to any plausible threat to its external security.
Torn between obsessive insecurity and proselytizing zeal, between the requirements of Europe and the temptations of Asia, the Russian Empire always had a role in the European equilibrium but was never emotionally a part of it. The requirements of conquest and of security became merged in the minds of Russian leaders. Since the Congress of Vienna, the Russian Empire has placed its military forces on foreign soil more often than any other major power. Analysts frequently explain Russian expansionism as stemming from a sense of insecurity. But Russian writers have far more often justified Russia's outward thrust as a messianic vocation. Russia on the march rarely showed a sense of limits; thwarted, it tended to withdraw into sullen resentment. For most of its history, Russia has been a cause looking for opportunity.
Postcommunist Russia finds itself within borders which reflect no historical precedent. Like Europe, it will have to devote much of its energy to redefining its identity. Will it seek to return to its historical rhythm and restore the lost empire? Will it shift its center of gravity eastward and become a more active participant in Asian diplomacy? By what principles and methods will it react to the upheavals around its borders, especially in the volatile Middle East? Russia will always be essential to world order and, in the inevitable turmoil associated with answering these questions, a potential menace to it.
China too faces a world order that is new to it. For 2,000 years, the Chinese Empire had united its world under a single imperial rule. To be sure, that rule had faltered at times. Wars occurred in China no less frequently than they did in Europe. But since they generally took place among contenders for the imperial authority, they were more in the nature of civil rather than international wars, and, sooner or later, invariably led to the emergence of some new central power.
Before the nineteenth century, China never had a neighbor capable of contesting its pre-eminence and never imagined that such a state could arise. Conquerors from abroad overthrew Chinese dynasties, only to be absorbed into Chinese culture to such an extent that they continued the traditions of the Middle Kingdom. The notion of the sovereign equality of states did not exist in China; outsiders were considered barbarians and were relegated to a tributary relationship -- that was how the first British envoy to Beijing was received in the eighteenth century. China disdained sending ambassadors abroad but was not above using distant barbarians to overcome the ones nearby. Yet this was a strategy for emergencies, not a day-to-day operational system like the European balance of power, and it failed to produce the sort of permanent diplomatic establishment characteristic of Europe. After China became a humiliated subject of European colonialism in the nineteenth century, it re-emerged only recently -- since the Second World War -- into a multipolar world unprecedented in its history.
Japan had also cut itself off from all contact with the outside world. For 500 years before it was forcibly opened by Commodore Matthew Perry in 1854, Japan did not even deign to balance the barbarians off against each other or to invent tributary relationships, as the Chinese had. Closed off from the outside world, Japan prided itself on its unique customs, gratified its military tradition by civil war, and rested its internal structure on the conviction that its unique culture was impervious to foreign influence, superior to it, and, in the end, would defeat it rather than absorb it.
In the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was the dominant security threat, Japan was able to identify its foreign policy with America, thousands of miles away. The new world order, with its multiplicity of challenges, will almost certainly oblige a country with so proud a past to re-examine its reliance on a single ally. Japan is bound to become more sensitive to the Asian balance of power than is possible for America, in a different hemisphere and facing in three directions -- across the Atlantic, across the Pacific, and toward South America. China, Korea, and Southeast Asia will acquire quite a different significance for Japan than for the United States, and will inaugurate a more autonomous and more self-reliant Japanese foreign policy.
As for India, which is now emerging as the major power in South Asia, its foreign policy is in many ways the last vestige of the heyday of European imperialism, leavened by the traditions of an ancient culture. Before the arrival of the British, the subcontinent had not been ruled as a single political unit for millennia. British colonization was accomplished with small military forces because, at first, the local population saw these as the replacement of one set of conquerors by another. But after it established unified rule, the British Empire was undermined by the very values of popular government and cultural nationalism it had imported into India. Yet, as a nation-state, India is a newcomer. Absorbed by the struggle to feed its vast population, India dabbled in the Nonaligned movement during the Cold War. But it has yet to assume a role commensurate with its size on the international political stage.
Thus, in effect, none of the most important countries which must build a new world order have had any experience with the multistate system that is emerging. Never before has a new world order had to be assembled from so many different perceptions, or on so global a scale. Nor has any previous order had to combine the attributes of the historic balance-of-power systems with global democratic opinion and the exploding technology of the contemporary period.
In retrospect, all international systems appear to have an inevitable symmetry. Once they are established, it is difficult to imagine how history might have evolved had other choices been made, or indeed whether any other choices had been possible. When an international order first comes into being, many choices may be open to it. But each choice constricts the universe of remaining options. Because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices are especially crucial. Whether an international order is relatively stable, like the one that emerged from the Congress of Vienna, or highly volatile, like those that emerged from the Peace of Westphalia and the Treaty of Versailles, depends on the degree to which they reconcile what makes the constituent societies feel secure with what they consider just.
The two international systems that were the most stable -- that of the Congress of Vienna and the one dominated by the United States after the Second World War -- had the advantage of uniform perceptions. The statesmen at Vienna were aristocrats who saw intangibles in the same way, and agreed on fundamentals; the American leaders who shaped the postwar world emerged from an intellectual tradition of extraordinary coherence and vitality.
The order that is now emerging will have to be built by statesmen who represent vastly different cultures. They tun huge bureaucracies of such complexity that, often, the energy of these statesmen is more consumed by serving the administrative machinery than by defining a purpose. They rise to eminence by means of qualities that are not necessarily those needed to govern, and are even less suited to building an international order. And the only available model of a multistate system was one built by Western societies, which many of the participants may reject.
Yet the rise and fall of previous world orders based on many states -- from the Peace of Westphalia to out time -- is the only experience on which one can draw in trying to understand the challenges facing contemporary statesmen. The study of history offers no manual of instructions that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations. But each generation must determine for itself which circumstances are in fact comparable.
Intellectuals analyze the operations of international systems; statesmen build them. And there is a vast difference between the perspective of an analyst and that of a statesman. The analyst can choose which problem he wishes to study, whereas the statesman's problems are imposed on him. The analyst can allot whatever time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the overwhelming challenge to the statesman is the pressure of time. The analyst runs no risk. If his conclusions prove wrong, he can write another treatise. The statesman is permitted only one guess; his mistakes are irretrievable. The analyst has available to him all the facts; he will be judged on his intellectual power. The statesman must act on assessments that cannot be proved at the time that he is making them; he will be judged by history on the basis of how wisely he managed the inevitable change and, above all, by how well he preserves the peace. That is why examining how statesmen have dealt with the problem of world order -- what worked or failed and why -- is not the end of understanding contemporary diplomacy, though it may be its beginning.
Copyright © 1994 by Henry A. Kissinger
A brilliant, sweeping history of diplomacy that includes personal stories from the noted former Secretary of State, including his stunning reopening of relations with China. The seminal work on foreign policy and the art of diplomacy. Identifier Diplomacy-Henry-Kissinger Identifier-ark ark:/13960/t9771q96v Ocr ABBYY FineReader 11.0 Ppi 600 Scanner Internet Archive HTML5 Uploader 1.6.3. Diplomacy is a 1994 book written by former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It is a sweep of the history of international relations and the art of diplomacy, largely concentrating on the 20th century and the Western World.
56th United States Secretary of State | |
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In office September 22, 1973 – January 20, 1977 | |
President | Richard Nixon Gerald Ford |
Deputy | Kenneth Rush Robert Ingersoll Charles Robinson |
Preceded by | William Rogers |
Succeeded by | Cyrus Vance |
8th United States National Security Advisor | |
In office January 20, 1969 – November 3, 1975 | |
President | Richard Nixon Gerald Ford |
Deputy | Richard Allen Alexander Haig Brent Scowcroft |
Preceded by | Walt Rostow |
Succeeded by | Brent Scowcroft |
Personal details | |
Born | Heinz Alfred Kissinger May 27, 1923 (age 96) Fürth, Weimar Republic |
Political party | Republican |
Spouse(s) | Nancy Maginnes (m. 1974) |
Children | 2 |
Education | City University of New York, City College Lafayette College Harvard University (BA, MA, PhD) |
Civilian awards | Nobel Peace Prize |
Signature | |
Military service | |
Allegiance | United States |
Branch/service | United States Army |
Years of service | 1943–1946 |
Rank | |
Unit | 970th Counter Intelligence Corps |
Battles/wars | World War II |
Military awards |
This article is part of a series on |
Conservatism in the United States |
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Henry Alfred Kissinger (/ˈkɪsɪndʒər/;[1]German: [ˈkɪsɪŋɐ]; born Heinz Alfred Kissinger; May 27, 1923) is an American politician, diplomat, and geopoliticalconsultant who served as United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor under the presidential administrations of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford.[2] A Jewish refugee who fled Nazi Germany with his family in 1938, he became National Security Advisor in 1969 and U.S. Secretary of State in 1973. For his actions negotiating a ceasefire in Vietnam, Kissinger received the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize under controversial circumstances, with two members of the committee resigning in protest.[3] Kissinger later sought, unsuccessfully, to return the prize after the ceasefire failed.[4][5]
A practitioner of Realpolitik,[6] Kissinger played a prominent role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, orchestrated the opening of relations with the People's Republic of China, engaged in what became known as shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East to end the Yom Kippur War, and negotiated the Paris Peace Accords, ending American involvement in the Vietnam War. Kissinger has also been associated with such controversial policies as U.S. involvement in the 1973 Chilean military coup, a 'green light' to Argentina's military junta for their Dirty War, and U.S. support for Pakistan during the Bangladesh War despite the genocide being perpetrated by his allies.[7] After leaving government, he formed Kissinger Associates, an international geopoliticalconsulting firm. Kissinger has written over one dozen books on diplomatic history and international relations.
Kissinger remains widely regarded as a controversial figure in American politics, and has been condemned as a war criminal by journalists, political activists, and human rights lawyers.[6][8][9][10] According to a 2014 survey by Foreign Policy magazine 32.21% of 'America's top International Relations scholars' considered Henry Kissinger the most effective U.S. Secretary of State since 1965.[11]
- 4Foreign policy
- 4.4Israeli policy and Soviet Jewry
- 4.6Latin American policy
- 5Later roles
- 5.1Views on U.S. foreign policy
- 7Family and personal life
- 9Writings: major books
- 13Further reading
Early life and education
Kissinger was born Heinz Alfred Kissinger in Fürth, Bavaria, Germany in 1923 to a family of German Jews.[12] His father, Louis Kissinger (1887–1982), was a schoolteacher. His mother, Paula (Stern) Kissinger (1901–1998), from Leutershausen, was a homemaker. Kissinger has a younger brother, Walter Kissinger (born 1924). The surname Kissinger was adopted in 1817 by his great-great-grandfather Meyer Löb, after the Bavarianspa town of Bad Kissingen.[13] In youth, Kissinger enjoyed playing soccer, and played for the youth wing of his favorite club, SpVgg Fürth, which was one of the nation's best clubs at the time.[14] In 1938, when Kissinger was 15 years old, fleeing Nazi persecution, his family briefly emigrated to London, England, before arriving in New York on September 5.
Kissinger spent his high school years in the Washington Heights section of Upper Manhattan as part of the German Jewish immigrant community that resided there at the time. Although Kissinger assimilated quickly into American culture, he never lost his pronounced German accent, due to childhood shyness that made him hesitant to speak.[15][16] Following his first year at George Washington High School, he began attending school at night and worked in a shaving brush factory during the day.[17]
Following high school, Kissinger enrolled in the City College of New York, studying accounting. He excelled academically as a part-time student, continuing to work while enrolled. His studies were interrupted in early 1943, when he was drafted into the U.S. Army.[18]
Army experience
Kissinger underwent basic training at Camp Croft in Spartanburg, South Carolina. On June 19, 1943, while stationed in South Carolina, at the age of 20 years, he became a naturalizedU.S. citizen. The army sent him to study engineering at Lafayette College, Pennsylvania, but the program was canceled, and Kissinger was reassigned to the 84th Infantry Division. There, he made the acquaintance of Fritz Kraemer, a fellow Jewish immigrant from Germany who noted Kissinger's fluency in German and his intellect, and arranged for him to be assigned to the military intelligence section of the division. Kissinger saw combat with the division, and volunteered for hazardous intelligence duties during the Battle of the Bulge.[19]
During the American advance into Germany, Kissinger, only a private, was put in charge of the administration of the city of Krefeld, owing to a lack of German speakers on the division's intelligence staff. Within eight days he had established a civilian administration.[20] Kissinger was then reassigned to the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), where he became a CIC Special Agent holding the enlisted rank of sergeant. He was given charge of a team in Hanover assigned to tracking down Gestapo officers and other saboteurs, for which he was awarded the Bronze Star.[21] In June 1945, Kissinger was made commandant of the Bensheim metro CIC detachment, Bergstrasse district of Hesse, with responsibility for de-Nazification of the district. Although he possessed absolute authority and powers of arrest, Kissinger took care to avoid abuses against the local population by his command.[22]
In 1946, Kissinger was reassigned to teach at the European Command Intelligence School at Camp King and, as a civilian employee following his separation from the army, continued to serve in this role.[23][24]
Academic career
Henry Kissinger received his BA degreesumma cum laude,Phi Beta Kappa[25] in political science from Harvard College in 1950, where he lived in Adams House and studied under William Yandell Elliott.[26] He received his MA and PhD degrees at Harvard University in 1951 and 1954, respectively. In 1952, while still a graduate student at Harvard, he served as a consultant to the director of the Psychological Strategy Board.[27] His doctoral dissertation was titled 'Peace, Legitimacy, and the Equilibrium (A Study of the Statesmanship of Castlereagh and Metternich)'.[28]
Kissinger remained at Harvard as a member of the faculty in the Department of Government and, with Robert R. Bowie, co-founded the Center for International Affairs in 1958 where he served as associate director. In 1955, he was a consultant to the National Security Council's Operations Coordinating Board.[27] During 1955 and 1956, he was also study director in nuclear weapons and foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He released his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy the following year.[29] From 1956 to 1958 he worked for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund as director of its Special Studies Project.[27] He was director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program between 1958 and 1971. He was also director of the Harvard International Seminar between 1951 and 1971. Outside of academia, he served as a consultant to several government agencies and think tanks, including the Operations Research Office, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, and the RAND Corporation.[27]
Keen to have a greater influence on U.S. foreign policy, Kissinger became foreign policy advisor to the presidential campaigns of Nelson Rockefeller, supporting his bids for the Republican nomination in 1960, 1964, and 1968.[30] After Richard Nixon became president in 1968, Kissinger was appointed as National Security Advisor.
Foreign policy
Kissinger being sworn in as Secretary of State by Chief Justice Warren Burger, September 22, 1973. Kissinger's mother, Paula, holds the Bible as President Nixon looks on.
Kissinger served as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under President Richard Nixon, and continued as Secretary of State under Nixon's successor Gerald Ford.[31] On Nixon's last full day in office, in the meeting where he informed Ford of his intention to resign the next day, he advised Ford that he felt it was very important that he keep Kissinger in his new administration, to which Ford agreed.[32]
The relationship between Nixon and Kissinger was unusually close, and has been compared to the relationships of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, or Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins.[33] In all three cases, the State Department was relegated to a backseat role in developing foreign policy.[34] Historian David Rothkopf has looked at the personalities of Nixon and Kissinger:
- They were a fascinating pair. In a way, they complemented each other perfectly. Kissinger was the charming and worldly Mr. Outside who provided the grace and intellectual-establishment respectability that Nixon lacked, disdained and aspired to. Kissinger was an international citizen. Nixon very much a classic American. Kissinger had a worldview and a facility for adjusting it to meet the times, Nixon had pragmatism and a strategic vision that provided the foundations for their policies. Kissinger would, of course, say that he was not political like Nixon—but in fact he was just as political as Nixon, just as calculating, just as relentlessly ambitious..these self-made men were driven as much by their need for approval and their neuroses as by their strengths.[35]
A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. In that period, he extended the policy of détente. This policy led to a significant relaxation in US–Soviet tensions and played a crucial role in 1971 talks with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The talks concluded with a rapprochement between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and the formation of a new strategic anti-Soviet Sino-American alignment. He was jointly awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize with Lê Đức Thọ for helping to establish a ceasefire and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. The ceasefire, however, was not durable.[36] Thọ declined to accept the award[37] and Kissinger appeared deeply ambivalent about it (donating his prize money to charity, not attending the award ceremony and later offering to return his prize medal[40]). As National Security Advisor, in 1974 Kissinger directed the much-debated National Security Study Memorandum 200.
Kissinger and Nixon shared a penchant for secrecy and conducted numerous 'backchannel' negotiations that excluded State Department experts. One such years-long backchannel was conducted through the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin. One historian argues that Kissinger formed such a strong 'bond of affection, trust, and mutual interest' with the ambassador that he came to see U.S.-Soviet relations as holding exaggerated significance. He typically met with or talked to Dobrynin about four times a week, and they had a direct line to each other's offices.[38]
Détente and the opening to China
As National Security Advisor under Nixon, Kissinger pioneered the policy of détente with the Soviet Union, seeking a relaxation in tensions between the two superpowers. As a part of this strategy, he negotiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (culminating in the SALT I treaty) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Negotiations about strategic disarmament were originally supposed to start under the Johnson Administration but were postponed in protest upon the invasion by Warsaw Pact troops of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.
Kissinger, shown here with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, negotiated rapprochement with the People's Republic of China.
Kissinger sought to place diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union. He made two trips to the People's Republic of China in July and October 1971 (the first of which was made in secret) to confer with Premier Zhou Enlai, then in charge of Chinese foreign policy.[39] According to Kissinger's book, 'The White House Years' and 'On China', the first secret China trip was arranged through Pakistani and Romanian[40] diplomatic and Presidential involvement, as there were no direct communication channels between the states. His trips paved the way for the groundbreaking 1972 summit between Nixon, Zhou, and Communist Party of China Chairman Mao Zedong, as well as the formalization of relations between the two countries, ending 23 years of diplomatic isolation and mutual hostility. The result was the formation of a tacit strategic anti-Soviet alliance between China and the United States.
While Kissinger's diplomacy led to economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides and the establishment of Liaison Offices in the Chinese and American capitals, with serious implications for Indochinese matters, full normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China would not occur until 1979, because the Watergate scandal overshadowed the latter years of the Nixon presidency and because the United States continued to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan.
In September 1989, the Wall Street Journal's John Fialka disclosed that Kissinger took a direct economic interest in US-China relations in March 1989 with the establishment of China Ventures, Inc., a Delaware limited partnership, of which he was chairman of the board and chief executive officer. A US$75 million investment in a joint venture with the Communist Party government's primary commercial vehicle at the time, China International Trust & Investment Corporation (CITIC), was its purpose. Board members were major clients of Kissinger Associates. Kissinger was criticised for not disclosing his role in the venture when called upon by ABC's Peter Jennings to comment the morning after the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen crackdown. Kissinger's position was generally supportive of Deng Xiaoping's clearance of the square and he opposed economic sanctions.[41]
Vietnam War
Kissinger and President Richard Nixon discussing the Vietnam situation in Camp David, 1972.
Kissinger's involvement in Indochina started prior to his appointment as National Security Adviser to Nixon. While still at Harvard, he had worked as a consultant on foreign policy to both the White House and State Department. Kissinger says that 'In August 1965 .. [Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.], an old friend serving as Ambassador to Saigon, had asked me to visit Vietnam as his consultant. I toured Vietnam first for two weeks in October and November 1965, again for about ten days in July 1966, and a third time for a few days in October 1966 .. Lodge gave me a free hand to look into any subject of my choice'. He became convinced of the meaninglessness of military victories in Vietnam, '.. unless they brought about a political reality that could survive our ultimate withdrawal'.[42] In a 1967 peace initiative, he would mediate between Washington and Hanoi.
Nixon had been elected in 1968 on the promise of achieving 'peace with honor' and ending the Vietnam War. In office, and assisted by Kissinger, Nixon implemented a policy of Vietnamization that aimed to gradually withdraw U.S. troops while expanding the combat role of the South Vietnamese Army so that it would be capable of independently defending its government against the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, a Communist guerrilla organization, and the North Vietnamese army (Vietnam People's Army or PAVN). Kissinger played a key role in bombing Cambodia to disrupt PAVN and Viet Cong units launching raids into South Vietnam from within Cambodia's borders and resupplying their forces by using the Ho Chi Minh trail and other routes, as well as the 1970 Cambodian Incursion and subsequent widespread bombing of Khmer Rouge targets in Cambodia. The bombing campaign contributed to the chaos of the Cambodian Civil War, which saw the forces of leader Lon Nol unable to retain foreign support to combat the growing Khmer Rouge insurgency that would overthrow him in 1975.[43][44] Documents uncovered from the Soviet archives after 1991 reveal that the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1970 was launched at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge and negotiated by Pol Pot's then second in command, Nuon Chea.[45] The American bombing of Cambodia resulted in 40,000[46]–150,000[47] deaths from 1969 to 1973, including at least 5,000 civilians.[48] Pol Pot biographer David P. Chandler argues that the bombing 'had the effect the Americans wanted—it broke the Communist encirclement of Phnom Penh.'[49] However, Ben Kiernan and Taylor Owen suggest that 'the bombs drove ordinary Cambodians into the arms of the Khmer Rouge, a group that seemed initially to have slim prospects of revolutionary success.'[50] Kissinger himself defers to others on the subject of casualty estimates. '..since I am in no position to make an accurate estimate of my own, I consulted the OSD Historian, who gave me an estimate of 50,000 based on the tonnage of bombs delivered over the period of four and a half years.'[51][verify][52]
Along with North Vietnamese Politburo Member Le Duc Tho, Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10, 1973, for their work in negotiating the ceasefires contained in the Paris Peace Accords on 'Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam', signed the previous January.[36] According to Irwin Abrams, this prize was the most controversial to date. For the first time in the history of the Peace Prize, two members left the Nobel Committee in protest.[3][53] Tho rejected the award, telling Kissinger that peace had not been restored in South Vietnam.[54] Kissinger wrote to the Nobel Committee that he accepted the award 'with humility,'[55][56] and 'donated the entire proceeds to the children of American servicemembers killed or missing in action in Indochina.'[4] After the Fall of Saigon in 1975, Kissinger attempted to return the award.[4][5]
Bangladesh War
Kissinger in the West Wing as National Security Adviser
Under Kissinger's guidance, the United States government supported Pakistan in the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. Kissinger was particularly concerned about the expansion of Soviet influence in the Indian Subcontinent as a result of a treaty of friendship recently signed by India and the USSR, and sought to demonstrate to the People's Republic of China (Pakistan's ally and an enemy of both India and the USSR) the value of a tacit alliance with the United States.[57][58][59]
Kissinger sneered at people who 'bleed' for 'the dying Bengalis' and ignored the first telegram from the United States consul general in East Pakistan, Archer K. Blood, and 20 members of his staff, which informed the US that their allies West Pakistan were undertaking, in Blood's words, 'a selective genocide'.[60] In the second, more famous, Blood Telegram the word genocide was again used to describe the events, and further that with its continuing support for West Pakistan the US government had 'evidenced [..] moral bankruptcy'.[61]As a direct response to the dissent against US policy Kissinger and Nixon ended Archer Blood's tenure as United States consul general in East Pakistan and put him to work in the State Department's Personnel Office.[62][63]
Kissinger had also come under fire for private comments he made to Nixon during the Bangladesh–Pakistan War in which he described Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as a 'bitch' and a 'witch'. He also said 'The Indians are bastards', shortly before the war.[64] Kissinger has since expressed his regret over the comments.[65]
Israeli policy and Soviet Jewry
Kissinger sits in the Oval Office with President Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, 1973
According to notes taken by H.R. Haldeman, Nixon 'ordered his aides to exclude all Jewish-Americans from policy-making on Israel', including Kissinger.[66] One note quotes Nixon as saying 'get K. [Kissinger] out of the play—Haig handle it'.[66]
In 1973, Kissinger did not feel that pressing the Soviet Union concerning the plight of Jews being persecuted there was in the interest of U.S. foreign policy. In conversation with Nixon shortly after a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir on March 1, 1973, Kissinger stated, 'The emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union is not an objective of American foreign policy, and if they put Jews into gas chambers in the Soviet Union, it is not an American concern. Maybe a humanitarian concern.'[67] Kissinger argued, however:
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That emigration existed at all was due to the actions of 'realists' in the White House. Jewish emigration rose from 700 a year in 1969 to near 40,000 in 1972. The total in Nixon's first term was more than 100,000. To maintain this flow by quiet diplomacy, we never used these figures for political purposes. .. The issue became public because of the success of our Middle East policy when Egypt evicted Soviet advisers. To restore its relations with Cairo, the Soviet Union put a tax on Jewish emigration. There was no Jackson–Vanik Amendment until there was a successful emigration effort. Sen. Henry Jackson, for whom I had, and continue to have, high regard, sought to remove the tax with his amendment. We thought the continuation of our previous approach of quiet diplomacy was the wiser course. .. Events proved our judgment correct. Jewish emigration fell to about a third of its previous high.[68]
1973 Yom Kippur War
Documents show that Kissinger delayed telling President Richard Nixon about the start of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 to keep him from interfering. On October 6, 1973, the Israelis informed Kissinger about the attack at 6 am; Kissinger waited nearly 3 and a half hours before he informed Nixon.[69]
On October 31, 1973, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi (left) meets with Richard Nixon (middle) and Henry Kissinger (right), about a week after the end of fighting in the Yom Kippur War.
According to Kissinger, in an interview in November 2013, he was notified at 6:30 a.m. (12:30 pm. Israel time) that war was imminent, and his urgent calls to the Soviets and Egyptians were ineffective. He says Golda Meir's decision not to preempt was wise and reasonable, balancing the risk of Israel looking like the aggressor and Israel's actual ability to strike within such a brief span of time.[70]
The war began on October 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Kissinger published lengthy telephone transcripts from this period in the 2002 book Crisis. On October 12, under Nixon's direction, and against Kissinger's initial advice,[71] while Kissinger was on his way to Moscow to discuss conditions for a cease-fire, Nixon sent a message to Brezhnev giving Kissinger full negotiating authority.[70]
Israel regained the territory it lost in the early fighting and gained new territories from Syria and Egypt, including land in Syria east of the previously captured Golan Heights, and additionally on the western bank of the Suez Canal, although they did lose some territory on the eastern side of the Suez Canal that had been in Israeli hands since the end of the Six-Day War. Kissinger pressured the Israelis to cede some of the newly captured land back to its Arab neighbors, contributing to the first phases of Israeli–Egyptian non-aggression. The move saw a warming in U.S.–Egyptian relations, bitter since the 1950s, as the country moved away from its former independent stance and into a close partnership with the United States. The peace was finalized in 1978 when U.S. President Jimmy Carter mediated the Camp David Accords, during which Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula in exchange for an Egyptian peace agreement that included the recognition of the state of Israel.
In the midst of the war, in what journalist Elizabeth Drew called “Strangelove Day,” Kissinger put U.S. military forces on DEFCON 3 late in the evening of October 24, in what a historian argues is 'best understood as an emotional response to a misunderstanding' with Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin.[38]
Turkish invasion of Cyprus
Following a period of steady relations between the U.S. Government and the Greek military regime after 1967, Secretary of State Kissinger was faced with the coup by the Greek junta and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July and August 1974. In an August 1974 edition of The New York Times, it was revealed that Kissinger and State Department were informed in advance οf the impending coup by the Greek junta in Cyprus. Indeed, according to the journalist,[72] the official version of events as told by the State Department was that it felt it had to warn the Greek military regime not to carry out the coup. The warning had been delivered by July 9, according to repeated assurances from its Athens services, that is, the U.S. embassy and the American ambassador Henry J. Tasca himself.
Ioannis Zigdis, then a Greek MP for Centre Union and former minister, claimed[73] that 'the Cyprus crisis will become Kissinger's Watergate'. Zigdis also stressed: 'Not only did Kissinger know about the coup for the overthrow of Archbishop Makarios before July 15th, he also encouraged it, if he did not instigate it.' It is unclear what evidence Zigdis had to support this allegation.
Kissinger was a target of anti-American sentiment which was a significant feature of Greek public opinion at the time—particularly among young people—viewing the U.S. role in Cyprus as negative. In a demonstration by students in Heraklion, Crete,[73][74] soon after the second phase of the Turkish invasion in August 1974, slogans such as 'Kissinger, murderer', 'Americans get out', 'No to Partition' and 'Cyprus is no Vietnam' were heard.
Some years later, Kissinger expressed the opinion that the Cyprus issue was resolved in 1974.[75]
Latin American policy
Ford and Kissinger conversing on the White House grounds, August 1974
The United States continued to recognize and maintain relationships with non-left-wing governments, democratic and authoritarian alike. John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress was ended in 1973. In 1974, negotiations over a new settlement for the Panama Canal began, and they eventually led to the Torrijos-Carter Treaties and the handing over of the Canal to Panamanian control.
Kissinger initially supported the normalization of United States-Cuba relations, broken since 1961 (all U.S.–Cuban trade was blocked in February 1962, a few weeks after the exclusion of Cuba from the Organization of American States because of U.S. pressure). However, he quickly changed his mind and followed Kennedy's policy. After the involvement of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces in the independence struggles in Angola and Mozambique, Kissinger said that unless Cuba withdrew its forces relations would not be normalized. Cuba refused.
Intervention in Chile
Chilean Socialist Party presidential candidate Salvador Allende was elected by a plurality of 36.2 percent in 1970, causing serious concern in Washington, D.C. due to his openly socialist and pro-Cuban politics. The Nixon administration, with Kissinger's input, authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to encourage a military coup that would prevent Allende's inauguration, but the plan was not successful.[76][77][78]:115[78]:495[79]:177
United States-Chile relations remained frosty during Salvador Allende's tenure, following the complete nationalization of the partially U.S.-owned copper mines and the Chilean subsidiary of the U.S.-based ITT Corporation, as well as other Chilean businesses. The U.S. claimed that the Chilean government had greatly undervalued fair compensation for the nationalization by subtracting what it deemed 'excess profits'. Therefore, the U.S. implemented economic sanctions against Chile. The CIA also provided funding for the mass anti-government strikes in 1972 and 1973, and extensive black propaganda in the newspaper El Mercurio.[78]:93
U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with Augusto Pinochet, January 1976
The most expeditious way to prevent Allende from assuming office was somehow to convince the Chilean congress to confirm Jorge Alessandri as the winner of the election. Once elected by the congress, Alessandri—a party to the plot through intermediaries—was prepared to resign his presidency within a matter of days so that new elections could be held. This first, nonmilitary, approach to stopping Allende was called the Track I approach.[76] The CIA's second approach, the Track II approach, was designed to encourage a military overthrow.[78]
On September 11, 1973, Allende died during a military coup launched by Army Commander-in-Chief Augusto Pinochet, who became President.[80]A document released by the CIA in 2000 titled 'CIA Activities in Chile' revealed that the United States, acting through the CIA, actively supported the military junta after the overthrow of Allende, and that it made many of Pinochet's officers into paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military.[81]
In September 1976, Orlando Letelier, a Chilean opponent of the Pinochet regime, was assassinated in Washington, D.C. with a car bomb. Previously, Kissinger had helped secure his release from prison,[82] and had chosen to cancel a letter to Chile warning them against carrying out any political assassinations.[83] The U.S. ambassador to Chile, David H. Popper, said that Pinochet might take as an insult any inference that he was connected with assassination plots.[84] It has been confirmed that Pinochet directly ordered the assassination.[85] This murder was part of Operation Condor, a covert program of political repression and assassination carried out by Southern Cone nations that Kissinger has been accused of being involved in.[8][86]
On September 10, 2001, the family of Chilean general René Schneider filed a suit against Kissinger, accusing him of collaborating in arranging Schneider's kidnapping which resulted in his death.[87] According to phone records, Kissinger claimed to have 'turned off' the operation.[88] However, the CIA claimed that no such 'stand-down' order was ever received,[89] and he and Nixon later joked that an 'incompetent' CIA had struggled to kill Schneider.[90][91] A subsequent Congressional investigation found that the CIA was not directly involved in Schneider's death.[88] The case was later dismissed by a U.S. District Court, citing separation of powers: 'The decision to support a coup of the Chilean government to prevent Dr. Allende from coming to power, and the means by which the United States Government sought to effect that goal, implicate policy makers in the murky realm of foreign affairs and national security best left to the political branches.'[92] Decades later the CIA admitted its involvement in the kidnapping of General Schneider, but not his murder, and subsequently paid the group responsible for his death $35,000 'to keep the prior contact secret, maintain the goodwill of the group, and for humanitarian reasons.'[93][94]
Argentina
Missing Kissinger Ebook
Kissinger took a similar line as he had toward Chile when the Argentine military, led by Jorge Videla, toppled the elected government of Isabel Perón in 1976 with a process called the National Reorganization Process by the military, with which they consolidated power, launching brutal reprisals and 'disappearances' against political opponents. An October 1987 investigative report in The Nation broke the story of how, in a June 1976 meeting in the Hotel Carrera in Santiago, Kissinger gave the bloody military junta in neighboring Argentina the 'green light' for their own clandestine repression against leftwing guerrillas and other dissidents, thousands of whom were kept in more than 400 secret concentration camps before they were executed. During a meeting with Argentine foreign minister César Augusto Guzzetti, Kissinger assured him that the United States was an ally, but urged him to 'get back to normal procedures' quickly before the U.S. Congress reconvened and had a chance to consider sanctions.[95][96][97][98]
As the article published in The Nation noted, as the state-sponsored terror mounted, conservative Republican U.S. Ambassador to Buenos Aires Robert C. Hill 'was shaken, he became very disturbed, by the case of the son of a thirty-year embassy employee, a student who was arrested, never to be seen again,' recalled former New York Times reporter Juan de Onis. 'Hill took a personal interest.' He went to the Interior Minister, a general with whom he had worked on drug cases, saying, 'Hey, what about this? We're interested in this case.' He questioned (Foreign Minister Cesar) Guzzetti and, finally, President Jorge R. Videla himself. 'All he got was stonewalling; he got nowhere.' de Onis said. 'His last year was marked by increasing disillusionment and dismay, and he backed his staff on human rights right to the hilt.'[99]
In a letter to The Nation editor Victor Navasky, protesting publication of the article, Kissinger claimed that: 'At any rate, the notion of Hill as a passionate human rights advocate is news to all his former associates.' Yet Kissinger aide Harry W. Shlaudeman later disagreed with Kissinger, telling the oral historian William E. Knight of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project: 'It really came to a head when I was Assistant Secretary, or it began to come to a head, in the case of Argentina where the dirty war was in full flower. Bob Hill, who was Ambassador then in Buenos Aires, a very conservative Republican politician -- by no means liberal or anything of the kind, began to report quite effectively about what was going on, this slaughter of innocent civilians, supposedly innocent civilians -- this vicious war that they were conducting, underground war. He, at one time in fact, sent me a back-channel telegram saying that the Foreign Minister, who had just come for a visit to Washington and had returned to Buenos Aires, had gloated to him that Kissinger had said nothing to him about human rights. I don't know -- I wasn't present at the interview.'[100]
Navasky later wrote in his book about being confronted by Kissinger, 'Tell me, Mr. Navasky,' [Kissinger] said in his famous guttural tones, 'how is it that a short article in a obscure journal such as yours about a conversation that was supposed to have taken place years ago about something that did or didn't happen in Argentina resulted in sixty people holding placards denouncing me a few months ago at the airport when I got off the plane in Copenhagen?'[101]
According to declassified state department files, Kissinger also attempted to thwart the Carter Administration's efforts to halt the mass killings by the 1976–83 military dictatorship.[102]
Rhodesia
In September 1976 Kissinger was actively involved in negotiations regarding the Rhodesian Bush War. Kissinger, along with South Africa's Prime Minister John Vorster, pressured Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to hasten the transition to black majority rule in Rhodesia. With FRELIMO in control of Mozambique and even South Africa withdrawing its support, Rhodesia's isolation was nearly complete. According to Smith's autobiography, Kissinger told Smith of Mrs. Kissinger's admiration for him, but Smith stated that he thought Kissinger was asking him to sign Rhodesia's 'death certificate'. Kissinger, bringing the weight of the United States, and corralling other relevant parties to put pressure on Rhodesia, hastened the end of minority-rule.[103]
East Timor
Suharto with Gerald Ford and Kissinger in Jakarta on 6 December 1975, one day before the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.
The Portuguese decolonization process brought U.S. attention to the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, which lies within the Indonesian archipelago and declared its independence in 1975. Indonesian president Suharto was a strong U.S. ally in Southeast Asia and began to mobilize the Indonesian army, preparing to annex the nascent state, which had become increasingly dominated by the popular leftist Fretilin party. In December 1975, Suharto discussed the invasion plans during a meeting with Kissinger and President Ford in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. Both Ford and Kissinger made clear that U.S. relations with Indonesia would remain strong and that it would not object to the proposed annexation.[104] They only wanted it done 'fast' and proposed that it be delayed until after they had returned to Washington.[105] Accordingly, Suharto delayed the operation for one day. Finally on December 7 Indonesian forces invaded the former Portuguese colony. U.S. arms sales to Indonesia continued, and Suharto went ahead with the annexation plan. According to Ben Kiernan, the invasion and occupation resulted in the deaths of nearly a quarter of the Timorese population from 1975 to 1981.[106]
Cuba
In February 1976, Kissinger considered launching air strikes against ports and military installations in Cuba, as well as deploying Marine battalions based at the US Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, in retaliation for Cuban President Fidel Castro's decision in late 1975 to send troops to Angola to help the newly independent nation fend off attacks from South Africa and right-wing guerrillas.[107]
Later roles
Kissinger meeting with President Ronald Reagan in the White House family quarters, 1981
Kissinger left office when Democrat Jimmy Carter defeated Republican Gerald Ford in the 1976 presidential elections. Kissinger continued to participate in policy groups, such as the Trilateral Commission, and to maintain political consulting, speaking, and writing engagements.
After Kissinger left office in 1977, he was offered an endowed chair at Columbia University. There was student opposition to the appointment, which became a subject of media commentary.[108][109] Columbia canceled the appointment as a result.
Kissinger was then appointed to Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.[110] He taught at Georgetown's Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service for several years in the late 1970s. Disney font free download. In 1982, with the help of a loan from the international banking firm of E.M. Warburg, Pincus and Company,[30] Kissinger founded a consulting firm, Kissinger Associates, and is a partner in affiliate Kissinger McLarty Associates with Mack McLarty, former chief of staff to President Bill Clinton.[111] He also serves on the board of directors of Hollinger International, a Chicago-based newspaper group,[112] and as of March 1999, was a director of Gulfstream Aerospace.[113]
From 1995 to 2001, Kissinger served on the board of directors for Freeport-McMoRan, a multinational copper and gold producer with significant mining and milling operations in Papua, Indonesia.[114] In February 2000, then-president of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid appointed Kissinger as a political advisor. He also serves as an honorary advisor to the United States-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce.
From 2000–2006, Kissinger served as chairman of the board of trustees of Eisenhower Fellowships. In 2006, upon his departure from Eisenhower Fellowships, he received the Dwight D. Eisenhower Medal for Leadership and Service.[115]
In November 2002, he was appointed by PresidentGeorge W. Bush to chair the newly established National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States to investigate the September 11 attacks.[116] Kissinger stepped down as chairman on December 13, 2002, rather than reveal his business client list, when queried about potential conflicts of interest.[117]
In the Rio Tinto espionage case of 2009–2010, Kissinger was paid $5 million to advise the multinational mining company how to distance itself from an employee who had been arrested in China for bribery.[118]
President Donald Trump meeting with Kissinger on May 10, 2017
Kissinger—along with William Perry, Sam Nunn, and George Shultz—has called upon governments to embrace the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in three Wall Street Journalop-eds proposed an ambitious program of urgent steps to that end. The four have created the Nuclear Threat Initiative to advance this agenda. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled 'Nuclear Tipping Point'. The film is a visual and historical depiction of the ideas laid forth in the Wall Street Journal op-eds and reinforces their commitment to a world without nuclear weapons and the steps that can be taken to reach that goal.
In December 2008, Kissinger was given the American Patriot Award by the National Defense University Foundation 'in recognition for his distinguished career in public service.' Earlier that year, a NDU professor had blown the whistle on the fact that a Chilean colleague at the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of U.S. Southern Command headquartered at NDU had not only been a member of Pinochet's DINA death squad operation (the same organization responsible for the 1976 car bomb murder of former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier and American aide Ronni Karpen Moffitt less than a mile from the White House), but was in addition accused of participating in the torture and murder of seven detainees in Chile. The whistleblower, Martin Edwin Andersen, was not only a senior staff member who earlier—as a senior advisor for policy planning at the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice—was the first national security whistleblower to receive the U.S. Office of Special Counsel's 'Public Servant Award,' but was also the same person who broke the story in The Nation on Kissinger's 'green light' for Argentina's dirty 'war.'[119][99]
On November 17, 2016, Kissinger met with then President-electDonald Trump during which they discussed global affairs.[120] Kissinger also met with President Trump at the White House in May 2017.[121]
In an interview with Charlie Rose on August 17, 2017, Kissinger said about President Trump: 'I'm hoping for an Augustinian moment, for St. Augustine .. who in his early life followed a pattern that was quite incompatible with later on when he had a vision, and rose to sainthood. One does not expect the president to become that, but it's conceivable ..'[122] Kissinger also argued that Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted to weaken Hillary Clinton, not elect Donald Trump. Kissinger said that Putin 'thought—wrongly incidentally—that she would be extremely confrontational .. I think he tried to weaken the incoming president [Clinton]'.[123]
Views on U.S. foreign policy
Yugoslav wars
President Barack Obama discussing the New START Treaty between the U.S. and Russia, 2010
In several articles of his and interviews that he gave during the Yugoslav wars, he criticized the United States' policies in Southeast Europe, among other things for the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state, which he described as a foolish act.[124] Most importantly he dismissed the notion of Serbs and Croats being aggressors or separatist, saying that 'they can't be separating from something that has never existed'.[125] In addition, he repeatedly warned the West against inserting itself into a conflict that has its roots at least hundreds of years back in time, and said that the West would do better if it allowed the Serbs and Croats to join their respective countries.[125] Kissinger shared similarly critical views on Western involvement in Kosovo. In particular, he held a disparaging view of the Rambouillet Agreement:
The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that any Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.
— Henry Kissinger, Daily Telegraph, June 28, 1999
However, as the Serbs did not accept the Rambouillet text and NATO bombings started, he opted for a continuation of the bombing as NATO's credibility was now at stake, but dismissed the use of ground forces, claiming that it was not worth it.[126]
Iraq
Kissinger speaking during Gerald Ford's funeral in January 2007
In 2006, it was reported in the book State of Denial by Bob Woodward that Kissinger met regularly with President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to offer advice on the Iraq War.[127] Kissinger confirmed in recorded interviews with Woodward[128] that the advice was the same as he had given in a column in The Washington Post on August 12, 2005: 'Victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy.'[129]
In an interview on the BBC's Sunday AM on November 19, 2006, Kissinger was asked whether there is any hope left for a clear military victory in Iraq and responded, 'If you mean by 'military victory' an Iraqi government that can be established and whose writ runs across the whole country, that gets the civil war under control and sectarian violence under control in a time period that the political processes of the democracies will support, I don't believe that is possible. .. I think we have to redefine the course. But I don't believe that the alternative is between military victory as it had been defined previously, or total withdrawal.'[130]
In an interview with Peter Robinson of the Hoover Institution on April 3, 2008, Kissinger reiterated that even though he supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq,[131] he thought that the George W. Bush administration rested too much of its case for war on Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction. Robinson noted that Kissinger had criticized the administration for invading with too few troops, for disbanding the Iraqi Army, and for mishandling relations with certain allies.[132]
India
Kissinger said in April 2008 that 'India has parallel objectives to the United States,' and he called it an ally of the U.S.[132]
China
Angela Merkel and Kissinger were at the state funeral for former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, November 23, 2015
Kissinger was present at the opening ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics.[133]
In 2011, Kissinger published On China, chronicling the evolution of Sino-American relations and laying out the challenges to a partnership of 'genuine strategic trust' between the U.S. and China.[134]
In his 2011 book On China, his 2014 book World Order and in a 2018 interview with Financial Times, Kissinger stated that he believes China wants to restore its historic role as the Middle Kingdom and be 'the principal adviser to all humanity'.[135][136][137]
Iran
Kissinger's position on this issue of U.S.–Iran talks was reported by the Tehran Times to be that 'Any direct talks between the U.S. and Iran on issues such as the nuclear dispute would be most likely to succeed if they first involved only diplomatic staff and progressed to the level of secretary of state before the heads of state meet.'[138] In 2016, Kissinger said that the biggest challenge facing the Middle East is the 'potential domination of the region by an Iran that is both imperial and jihadist.' He further wrote in August 2017 that if the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran and its Shiite allies were allowed to fill the territorial vacuum left by a militarily defeated Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the region would be left with a land corridor extending from Iran to the Levant 'which could mark the emergence of an Iranian radical empire.'[139] Commenting on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Kissinger said that he wouldn't have agreed to it, but that Trump's plan to end the agreement after it was signed would 'enable the Iranians to do more than us.'[140]
2014 Ukrainian crisis
Henry Kissinger on April 26, 2016
On March 5, 2014, The Washington Post published an op-ed piece by Kissinger, 11 days before the Crimean referendum on whether Autonomous Republic of Crimea should officially rejoin Ukraine or join neighboring Russia.[141] In it, he attempted to balance the Ukrainian, Russian and Western desires for a functional state. He made four main points:
- Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe;
- Ukraine should not join NATO, a repetition of the position he took seven years before;
- Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. He imagined an international position for Ukraine like that of Finland.
- Ukraine should maintain sovereignty over Crimea.
Kissinger also wrote: 'The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other—as has been the pattern—would lead eventually to civil war or break up.'[141]
Following the publication of his book titled World Order, Kissinger participated in an interview with Charlie Rose and updated his position on Ukraine, which he sees as a possible geographical mediator between Russia and the West.[142] In a question he posed to himself for illustration regarding re-conceiving policy regarding Ukraine, Kissinger stated: 'If Ukraine is considered an outpost, then the situation is that its eastern border is the NATO strategic line, and NATO will be within 200 miles (320 km) of Volgograd. That will never be accepted by Russia. On the other hand, if the Russian western line is at the border of Poland, Europe will be permanently disquieted. The Strategic objective should have been to see whether one can build Ukraine as a bridge between East and West, and whether one can do it as a kind of a joint effort.'[143]
In December 2016, Kissinger advised then President-electDonald Trump to accept 'Crimea as a part of Russia' in an attempt to secure a rapprochement between the United States and Russia, whose relations soured as a result of the Crimean crisis.[144]
When asked if he explicitly considered Russia's sovereignty over Crimea legitimate, Kissinger answered in the affirmative, reversing the position he took in his Washington Post op-ed.[145]
Public perception
At the height of Kissinger's prominence, many commented on his wit. In February 1972, at the Washington Press Club annual congressional dinner, 'Kissinger mocked his reputation as a secret swinger.'[146] The insight, 'Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac', is widely attributed to him, although Kissinger was paraphrasing Napoleon Bonaparte.[147] Some scholars have ranked Kissinger as the most effective U.S. Secretary of State in the 50 years to 2015.[11] A number of activists and human rights lawyers, however, have sought his prosecution for alleged war crimes.[8][148] According to historian and Kissinger biographer Niall Ferguson, however, accusing Kissinger alone of war crimes 'requires a double standard' because 'nearly all the secretaries of state .. and nearly all the presidents' have taken similar actions.[149]
Colin Powell, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Kissinger in March 2016
Kissinger was interviewed in Back Door Channels: The Price of Peace, a documentary examining the underpinnings of the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt.[150]
Attempts were made to blame Kissinger for injustices in American foreign policy during his tenure in government. In September 2001, relatives and survivors of General Rene Schneider (former head of the Chilean general staff) filed civil proceedings in Federal Court in Washington, DC, and, in April 2002, a petition for Kissinger's arrest was filed in the High Court in London by human rights campaigner Peter Tatchell,[151] citing the destruction of civilian populations and the environment in Indochina during the years 1969–75. Both suits were determined to lack legal foundation and were dismissed.[152] British-American journalist and author Christopher Hitchens authored The Trial of Henry Kissinger, in which Hitchens calls for the prosecution of Kissinger 'for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, and for offenses against common or customary or international law, including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture'.[153][154][155][156] Critics on the right, such as Ray Takeyh, have faulted Kissinger for his role in the Nixon administration's opening to China and secret negotiations with North Vietnam. Takeyh writes that while rapprochement with China was a worthy goal, the Nixon administration failed to achieve any meaningful concessions from Chinese officials in return, as China continued to support North Vietnam and various 'revolutionary forces throughout the Third World,' 'nor does there appear to be even a remote, indirect connection between Nixon and Kissinger's diplomacy and the communist leadership's decision, after Mao's bloody rule, to move away from a communist economy towards state capitalism.'
On Vietnam, Takeyh claims that Kissinger's negotiations with Le Duc Tho were intended only 'to secure a 'decent interval' between America's withdrawal and South Vietnam's collapse.'[5] Johannes Kadura offers a more positive assessment of Nixon and Kissinger's strategy, arguing that the two men 'simultaneously maintained a Plan A of further supporting Saigon and a Plan B of shielding Washington should their maneuvers prove futile.' According to Kadura, the 'decent interval' concept has been 'largely misrepresented,' in that Nixon and Kissinger 'sought to gain time, make the North turn inward, and create a perpetual equilibrium' rather than acquiescing in the collapse of South Vietnam, but the strength of the anti-war movement and the sheer unpredictability of events in Indochina compelled them to prepare for the possibility that South Vietnam might collapse despite their best efforts. Kadura concludes: 'Without Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford's clever use of triangular diplomacy .. The Soviets and the Chinese could have been tempted into a far more aggressive stance' following the 'U.S. defeat in Indochina' than actually occurred.[157] In 2011, Chimerica Media released an interview-based documentary, titled Kissinger, in which Kissinger 'reflects on some of his most important and controversial decisions' during his tenure as Secretary of State.[158]
Kissinger's record was brought up during the 2016 Democratic Party presidential primaries. Hillary Clinton had cultivated a close relationship with Kissinger, describing him as a 'friend' and a source of 'counsel.'[159] During the Democratic Primary Debates, Clinton touted[160] Kissinger's praise for her record as Secretary of State.[161] In response, candidate Bernie Sanders issued a critique of Kissinger's foreign policy, declaring: 'I am proud to say that Henry Kissinger is not my friend. I will not take advice from Henry Kissinger.'[162]
Family and personal life
Henry and Nancy Kissinger at the Metropolitan Opera opening in 2008
Kissinger married Ann Fleischer on February 6, 1949. They had two children, Elizabeth and David, and divorced in 1964. On March 30, 1974, he married Nancy Maginnes.[163][164] They now live in Kent, Connecticut, and in New York City. Kissinger's son David Kissinger served as an executive with NBCUniversal before becoming head of Conaco, Conan O'Brien's production company.[165] In February 1982, Kissinger underwent coronary bypass surgery at the age of 58.
Kissinger described Diplomacy as his favorite game in a 1973 interview.[166]
Soccer
Daryl Grove characterised Kissinger as one of the most influential people in the growth of soccer in the United States.[167] Kissinger was named chairman of the North American Soccer League board of directors in 1978.[168]
Since his childhood, Kissinger has been a fan of his hometown's soccer club, SpVgg Greuther Fürth. Even during his time in office, the German Embassy informed him about the team's results every Monday morning. He is an honorary member[169] with lifetime season-tickets.[170] In September 2012 Kissinger attended a home game in which SpVgg Greuther Fürth lost, 0–2, against Schalke after promising years ago he would attend a Greuther Fürth home game if they were promoted to the Bundesliga, the top football league in Germany, from the 2. Bundesliga.[171]
Awards, honors, and associations
- Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were jointly offered the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for their work on the Paris Peace Accords which prompted the withdrawal of American forces from the Vietnam war. (Le Duc Tho declined to accept the award on the grounds that such 'bourgeois sentimentalities' were not for him[40] and that peace had not actually been achieved in Vietnam.) Kissinger donated his prize money to charity, did not attend the award ceremony and would later offer to return his prize medal after the fall of South Vietnam to North Vietnamese forces 18 months later.[40]
- In 1973, Kissinger received the U.S. Senator John Heinz Award for Greatest Public Service by an Elected or Appointed Official, an award given out annually by Jefferson Awards.[172]
- In 1976, Kissinger became the first honorary member of the Harlem Globetrotters.[173][174]
Kissinger at the LBJ Library in 2016
- On January 13, 1977, Kissinger received the Presidential Medal of Freedom from President Gerald Ford.President Ford, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, and Kissinger speaking informally at the Vladivostok Summit in 1974
- In 1980, Kissinger won the National Book Award in History[a] for the first volume of his memoirs, The White House Years.[175]
- In 1986, Kissinger was one of twelve recipients of the Medal of Liberty.
- In 1995, he was made an honorary Knight Commander of the Most Distinguished Order of St Michael and St George.[176]
- In 2000, Kissinger received the Sylvanus Thayer Award at United States Military Academy at West Point.[177]
- In 2002, Kissinger became an honorary member of the International Olympic Committee.[178]
- On March 1, 2012, Kissinger was awarded Israel's President's Medal.
- In October 2013, Kissinger was awarded the Henry A. Grunwald Award for Public Service by Lighthouse International
- Kissinger was a member of the Founding Council of the Rothermere American Institute, University of Oxford.[179]
- Kissinger is a member of the following groups:
- Aspen Institute[180]
- Atlantic Council[181]
- Bilderberg Group[182][183]
- Bohemian Club[184]
- Council on Foreign Relations[185]
- Center for Strategic and International Studies[186]
- Kissinger served on the board of Theranos, a health technology company, from 2014 to 2017.[187][188][189]
- He received the Theodore Roosevelt American Experience Award from the Union League Club of New York in 2009.
- He became the Honorary Chair of the Advisory Board for the Bloomberg New Economy Forum[190] in 2018.
Writings: major books
Memoirs
- 1979. The White House Years. ISBN0316496618 (National Book Award, History Hardcover)[175][a]
- 1982. Years of Upheaval. ISBN0316285919
- 1999. Years of Renewal. ISBN0684855712
Public policy
- 1957. A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22. ISBN0395172292
- 1957. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. ISBN0865317453 (1984 edition)
- 1961. The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy. ISBN0060124105
- 1965. The Troubled Partnership: A Re-Appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance. ISBN0070348952
- 1969. American Foreign Policy: Three Essays. ISBN0297179330
- 1981. For the Record: Selected Statements 1977–1980. ISBN0316496634
- 1985. Observations: Selected Speeches and Essays 1982–1984. ISBN0316496642
- 1994. Diplomacy. ISBN067165991X
- 1999. Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks With Beijing and Moscow (Henry Kissinger, William Burr). ISBN1565844807
- 2001. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century. ISBN0684855674
- 2002. Vietnam: A Personal History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War. ISBN0743219163
- 2003. Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises: Based on the Record of Henry Kissinger's Hitherto Secret Telephone Conversations. ISBN978-0743249119
- 2011. On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011). ISBN978-1594202711.
- 2014. World Order (New York: Penguin Press, September 9, 2014). ISBN978-1594206146.
See also
Notes
- ^ abThis was the 1980 award for hardcover History. From 1980 to 1983 there were dual hardcover and paperback awards in most categories, and multiple nonfiction subcategories. Most of the paperback award-winners were reprints, including Kissinger's.
References
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- ^ abFeldman, Burton (2001). The Nobel Prize: A History Of Genius, Controversy, and Prestige. Arcade Publishing. p. 16. ISBN978-1-55970-537-0.
- ^ abcDommen, Arthur (2002). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Indiana University Press. p. 878. ISBN9780253109255.
- ^ abcTakeyh, Ray (June 13, 2016). 'The Perils of Secret Diplomacy'. The Weekly Standard. Retrieved June 28, 2016.
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- ^'Protesters Heckle Kissinger, Denounce Him for 'War Crimes''. The Times of Israel. January 30, 2015. Retrieved December 14, 2015.
- ^Nevius, James (February 13, 2016). 'Does Hillary Clinton see that invoking Henry Kissinger harms her campaign?'. The Guardian. Retrieved October 23, 2016. '[..] many consider Kissinger a war criminal, most famously Christopher Hitchens, who, in a lengthy two-part article for Harper's in 2001 (later expanded into the book and documentary, The Trial of Henry Kissinger), laid out his case that Kissinger should be brought up on charges 'for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, and for offenses against common or customary or international law, including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap, and torture'.
- ^ ab'The Best International Relations Schools in the World'. Foreign Policy. February 3, 2015. Retrieved August 8, 2015.
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- ^Isaacson 1992, p. 48.
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- ^Kissinger, Henry (1954). Peace, legitimacy, and the equilibrium: (a study of the statesmanship of Castlereagh and Metternich) (Thesis). Cambridge, Mass.: Kissinger.
- ^Kissinger, Henry (1957). Nuclear weapons and foreign policy. Harper & Brothers. p. 455. ISBN978-0-393-00494-6.
- ^ abRothbard, Murray (May 1991). 'Why the War? The Kuwait Connection'. LewRockwell.com. Archived from the original on February 15, 2016. Retrieved February 13, 2016.
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- ^Robert S. Litwak (1986). Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976. Cambridge UP. p. 48.
- ^Geoffrey Warner, 'Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971.' International Affairs 81.5 (2005): 1097-1118.
- ^David Rothkopf, Running the world: the inside story of the National Security Council and the architects of American foreign policy (2004), pp. 111–12.
- ^ ab'The Nobel Peace Prize 1973'. Nobel Foundation. Retrieved December 31, 2006.
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- ^ abBarbara Keys, 'Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman,' Diplomatic History 35, no. 4 (September 2011): 587-609.
- ^Dube, Clayton. 'Getting to Beijing: Henry Kissinger's Secret 1971 Trip'. USC U.S.-China Institute. Retrieved July 21, 2011.
- ^'On China' by H. Kissinger
- ^Soley, Lawrence C. (1992). The News Shapers: The Sources who Explain the News. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. ?.
- ^Kissinger, Henry A. (1979). White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. pp. 231–32.
- ^Totten, Samuel; Parsons, William S.; Charny, Israel W. (2004). Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. Routledge. p. 349. ISBN978-0-415-94430-4. Retrieved October 16, 2009.
- ^Smyth, Marie; Robinson, Gillian (2001). Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues. United Nations University Press. p. 93. ISBN978-92-808-1065-3. Retrieved October 16, 2009.
- ^Dmitry Mosyakov, 'The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives', in Susan E. Cook, ed., Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda (Yale Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series No. 1, 2004), p. 54ff. Available online at: www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/Mosyakov.doc 'In April–May 1970, many North Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia in response to the call for help addressed to Vietnam not by Pol Pot, but by his deputy Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: 'Nuon Chea has asked for help and we have liberated five provinces of Cambodia in ten days.'
- ^Marek Sliwinski, Le Génocide Khmer Rouge: Une Analyse Démographique (L'Harmattan, 1995), pp. 41–48.
- ^Kiernan, Ben (2004). How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism in Cambodia, 1930–1975. Yale University Press. p. xxiii. ISBN978-0300102628. Retrieved February 12, 2016.
- ^Greenberg, Jon (September 11, 2014). 'Kissinger: Drones have killed more civilians than the bombing of Cambodia in the Vietnam War'. Politifact.com. Retrieved February 13, 2016.
- ^Chandler, David 2000, Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, Revised Edition, Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, pp. 96–97.
- ^Owen, Taylor; Kiernan, Ben. 'Making More Enemies than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications'. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. 13 (16). Retrieved October 16, 2016.
- ^Karen Coates and Jerry Redfern (September 18, 2014). Henry Kissinger is not telling the truth about his past. Again. The Washington Post. Retrieved October 16, 2016.
- ^Henry Kissinger (February 11, 2003). Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War. Simon and Schuster. p. 70. ISBN978-0-7432-4577-7.
- ^Abrams, Irwin (2001). The Nobel Peace Prize and the Laureates: An Illustrated Biographical History, 1901–2001. Science History Pubns. p. 219. ISBN978-0-88135-388-4.
- ^Le Duc Tho to Henry Kissinger, October 27, 1973.
- ^'The Nobel Peace Prize 1973: Presentation Speech by Mrs. Aase Lionaes, Chairman of the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Storting'. Nobel Foundation. December 10, 1973. Retrieved April 28, 2007.
In his letter of November 2 to the Nobel Committee Henry Kissinger expresses his deep sense of this obligation. In the letter he writes among other things: 'I am deeply moved by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, which I regard as the highest honor one could hope to achieve in the pursuit of peace on this earth. When I consider the list of those who have been so honored before me, I can only accept this award with humility.' .. This year Henry Kissinger was appointed Secretary-of-State in the United States. In his letter to the Committee he writes as follows: 'I greatly regret that because of the press of business in a world beset by recurrent crisis I shall be unable to come to Oslo on December 10 for the award ceremony. I have accordingly designated Ambassador Byrne to represent me on that occasion.'
- ^Lundestad, Geir (March 15, 2001). 'The Nobel Peace Prize 1901–2000'. Nobel Foundation. Retrieved December 31, 2006.
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- ^Bass, Gary (September 29, 2013). 'Nixon and Kissinger's Forgotten Shame'. The New York Times. Retrieved May 27, 2014.
- ^Dymond, Jonny (December 11, 2011). 'The Blood Telegram'. BBC Radio. Retrieved May 27, 2014.
- ^'Selective Genocide'(PDF). Retrieved March 12, 2015.
- ^'Dissent from US Policy towards East Pakistan'(PDF). Retrieved March 12, 2015.
- ^Holley, Joe (September 23, 2004). 'Archer K. Blood; Dissenting Diplomat'. The Washington Post. Retrieved May 27, 2014.
- ^Bass, Gary (April 23, 2014). 'The act of defiance that infuriated Henry Kissinger'. The Globe and Mail. Retrieved April 23, 2014.
- ^Keefer, Edward C.; Smith, Louis J. (2005). '150. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President's Chief of Staff (Haldeman), Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:15–9:00 am'. Foreign Relations, 1969–1976. E-7 (19). Retrieved December 30, 2006.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
- ^'Kissinger regrets India comments'. BBC. July 1, 2005. Retrieved December 15, 2006.
- ^ abChait, Jonathan (December 10, 2010) Nixon Disallowed Jewish Advisors From Discussing Israel Policy, The New Republic
- ^Nagourney, Adam (December 10, 2010). 'In Tapes, Nixon Rails About Jews and Blacks'. The New York Times.
- ^Kissinger, Henry. 'Putting The Nixon Tape In Context'Archived April 11, 2012, at the Wayback Machine. The Washington Post. December 26, 2010.
- ^'Book says Kissinger delayed telling Nixon about Yom Kippur War'. Haaretz. Reuters. April 3, 2007. Retrieved November 9, 2012.
- ^ abLaor, Yitzhak (November 2, 2013). 'Kissinger wants Israel to know: The U.S. saved you during the 1973 war'. Haaretz. Retrieved February 15, 2014.
- ^Siniver, Asaf (2008). Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making; The Machinery of Crisis. New York: Cambridge. p. 188. ISBN978-0-521-89762-4.
- ^Article republished on the front page of the Greek newspaper To Vima, issue of Fr. August 2, 1974, article 'The Americans knew there was plan to overthrow Makarios' [Οἱ Ἀμερικανοί ἐγνώριζον ὅτι ἑτοιμάζετο ἀνατροπή τοῦ Μακαρίου στήν Κύπρο] (photo-reprint in the book series 'To Vima – 90 years', Lambrakis Press 2012, volume XI '1972–1981')
- ^ abFront page of the Greek newspaper To Vima, issue of Sa. August 17, 1974, articles 'Τhe Cyprus crisis is Kissinger's Watergate' [Τό Κυπριακό εἶναι το Γουώτεργκέητ τοῦ κ. Κίσσινγκερ] and 'Anti-American youth demonstration in Thessaloniki and Heraklion' [Ἀντιαμερικανική διαδήλωσις νέων εἰς τήν Θεσσαλονίκην και εἰς τό Ἡράκλειον] (photo-reprint in the book series 'To Vima – 90 years', as above).
- ^'To Vima' (August 17, 1974) original text passages on the demonstrations: Θεσσαλονίκη 16 Αὐγούστου. Σιωπηρά ἀντιαμερικανική διαδήλωση ἐπραγματοποίησαν σήμερα Κύπριοι φοιτηταί τοῦ Πανεπιστημόυ Θεσσαλονίκης [..]περίπου 150 διελήθησαν ἀργότερον ἡσύχως.[..] Ἡράκλειον 16 Αὐγούστου. Οἱ διαδηλωταί φέροντες ἑληνικάς σημαίας καί εἰκόνας τοῦ Καραμανλῆ καί τοῦ Μακαρίου περιήρχοντο μέχρις ἀργά τό βράδυ [..] κραυγάζοντες συνθήματα ὅπως 'Δολοφόνε Κίσσινγκερ', 'Ἔξω οἱ Ἀμερικανοί', ' Ὄχι διχοτόμηση', 'Ζήτω ὁ Καρμανλῆς', 'Ἑνωμένοι Ἕλληνες', 'Συμπαράσταση Λαέ', 'Ὄχι ἡ Κύπρος Βιετνάμ'. [..] ὑπολογίζονται δε εἰς 5.000'
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As secretary of state, Henry Kissinger cancelled a U.S. warning against carrying out international political assassinations that was to have gone to Chile and two neighboring nations just days before a former ambassador was killed by Chilean agents on Washington's Embassy Row in 1976, a newly released State Department cable shows.
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Ford and Kissinger Gave Green Light to Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor, 1975: New Documents Detail Conversations with Suharto
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- ^'Bob Woodward: Bush Misleads On Iraq'. CBS News. October 1, 2006. Archived from the original on October 19, 2017. Retrieved December 29, 2006.
- ^Woodward, Bob (October 1, 2006). 'Secret Reports Dispute White House Optimism'. The Washington Post. p. A01. Retrieved December 29, 2006.
- ^Kissinger, Henry A. (August 12, 2005). 'Lessons for an Exit Strategy'. The Washington Post. p. A19. Retrieved December 29, 2006.
- ^Marr, Andrew (November 19, 2006). 'US Policy on Iraq'. Sunday AM. BBC. Retrieved December 29, 2006.
- ^Kissinger, Henry A. (August 11, 2002). 'Iraq is Becoming Bush's Most Difficult Challenge'. Chicago Tribune. Retrieved February 13, 2016.
- ^ abRobinson, Peter M. (April 3, 2008). 'Kissinger on War & More'. Hoover Institution. Archived from the original on January 25, 2012. Retrieved August 10, 2009.
- ^Juan Williams (August 12, 2008). 'Pioneers of U.S.-China Relations Attend Olympics'. NPR. Retrieved May 28, 2012.
Among the political luminaries attending the Beijing Olympics are Henry Kissinger and former President George H.W. Bush.
- ^Friedberg, Aaron. 'The Unrealistic Realist'. The New Republic. Retrieved July 22, 2011.
- ^Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. United States: Penguin Press. ISBN978-1594202711.
- ^Kissinger, Henry (September 9, 2014). World Order. United States: Penguin Books Limited. ISBN978-0241004272.
- ^Luce, Edward (July 20, 2018). 'Henry Kissinger: 'We are in a very, very grave period''. Financial Times. Retrieved October 4, 2018.
- ^'Kissinger backs direct U.S. negotiations with Iran'. The Tehran Times. September 27, 2008. Retrieved September 27, 2008. (Transcript of a Bloomberg reportinterview.)
- ^Khan, Shehab (August 7, 2017). 'Henry Kissinger warns destroying Isis could lead to 'Iranian radical empire''. The Independent. Retrieved November 19, 2018.
- ^'Kissinger: To Prevent Regional Explosion, US Must Thwart Iranian Expansionism'. The Algemeiner. November 11, 2016. Retrieved August 8, 2017.
- ^ abHenry A. Kissinger (March 5, 2014). 'Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end'. The Washington Post.
- ^Charlie Rose, PBS, September 2014.
- ^Charlie Rose, reported in Bloomberg BusinessWeek, p. 20, October 2, 2014.
- ^Buncombe, Andrew (December 27, 2016). 'Henry Kissinger has 'advised Donald Trump to accept' Crimea as part of Russia'. The Independent. New York. Retrieved December 28, 2016.
- ^'Kissinger advises Trump to accept Crimea as Russia – Bild'. Ukraine Today. December 27, 2016. Retrieved December 28, 2016.
- ^'Henry Kissinger Off Duty.' Time, February 7, 1972.
- ^O'Connell, Loraine (December 26, 2001). 'Authors: Men's power is sexy, women's suspect'. Retrieved March 23, 2016.
- ^'Protesters heckle Kissinger, denounce him for 'war crimes''. The Times of Israel. Retrieved December 14, 2015.
- ^'Fareed Zakaria GPS: Islamic Infighting, Iran versus Saudi Arabia; Inside the Oil Kingdom; Kim Jong-Un's Quest for the H-Bomb; Interview with Niall Ferguson; Interview with Gary Kasparov'. CNN. January 10, 2016. Retrieved February 13, 2016.
- ^'TV Festival 2009 : Opening Film'. Tvfestival.net. Archived from the original on October 5, 2009. Retrieved March 10, 2010.
- ^'Warrant Sought for the Arrest of Henry Kissinger'. Archived from the original on September 13, 2015. Retrieved December 5, 2015.
- ^'Why the law wants a word with Kissinger', Fairfax Digital, April 30, 2002
- ^, Slate, December 13, 2010, 'How Can Anyone Defend Kissinger Now? The Nixon tapes remind us what a vile creature Henry Kissinger is'. Retrieved January 8, 2016.
- ^Hitchens, Christopher (November 27, 2002). 'The Latest Kissinger Outrage'. Slate. Archived from the original on January 1, 2016. Retrieved November 25, 2011.
- ^'Show us the papers, Hitchens'. New Statesman. Archived from the original on March 13, 2012. Retrieved November 25, 2011.
- ^Hitchens, Christopher (December 14, 2010). 'Latest Nixon Tape Buries Kissinger's Reputation'. National Post. Retrieved November 25, 2011.
- ^Kadura, Johannes (2016). The War After the War: The Struggle for Credibility During America's Exit From Vietnam. Cornell University Press. pp. 4, 153. ISBN978-0801453960.
- ^Kissinger (TV Movie, 2011) on IMDb
- ^'Hillary Clinton's Ties to Henry Kissinger Come Back to Haunt Her'. The New York Times – First Draft.
- ^'Henry Kissinger, Hillary Clinton's Tutor in War and Peace'. The Nation.
- ^'Praise for Hillary Clinton'. Correct the Record. Retrieved February 13, 2016.
- ^Philip Bump (February 12, 2016). 'Why Bernie Sanders sees Henry Kissinger's controversial history as an asset'. The Washington Post.
- ^'Henry Kissinger Fast Facts'. CNN. May 12, 2017.
- ^Schlessinger, Bernard S.; Schlessinger, June H. (September 1, 1986). 'The Who's who of Nobel Prize winners'. Oryx Press – via Google Books.
- ^'NBC Universal Television Studio Co-President David Kissinger Joins Conaco Productions as New President' (Press release). NBC Universal Television Studio. May 25, 2005.
- ^Games & Puzzles magazine, May 1973.
- ^'The Five Most Influential People in American Soccer', American Soccer Now, Daryl Grove, February 18, 2013.
- ^'Kissinger takes post as NASL chairman'. The Victoria Advocate. October 5, 1978. Archived from the original on May 18, 2016. Retrieved March 21, 2010.
- ^'Der berühmteste Fan – Henry A. Kissinger – Reisender in Sachen Weltpolitik' [The most famous supporter - Henry A. Kissinger - Traveller in the realm of world politics]. Kleeblatt-Chronik.de (in German). Archived from the original on October 12, 2017. Retrieved February 25, 2012.
- ^'Uli Hesse: Go Furth and conquer'. ESPN FC. February 17, 2012. Retrieved February 15, 2014.
- ^'Kissinger keeps promise to attend Greuther Fuerth game'. Archived from the original on September 19, 2012.
- ^'National Winners | public service awards'. Jefferson Awards.org. Archived from the original on November 24, 2010. Retrieved February 15, 2014.
- ^Sandra Crockett (January 4, 1996). 'Halem Globetrotters still inspire hoop screams'. The Baltimore Sun.
- ^'Harlem Globetrotters History'. Harlem Globetrotters. Archived from the original on May 5, 2014. Retrieved May 5, 2014.
- ^ ab'National Book Awards – 1980'. National Book Foundation. Retrieved March 16, 2012.
- ^Kissinger, Henry Alfred[dead link] in Who's Who in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, 1999
- ^'Sylvanus Thayer Award Recipients'. West Point Association of Graduates. Retrieved May 5, 2014.
- ^International Olympic Committee: Mr Henry Kissinger. Retrieved February 20, 2014.
- ^'Founding Council | The Rothermere American Institute'. Rothermere American Institute. Archived from the original on November 17, 2012. Retrieved November 22, 2012.
- ^'Lifetime Trustees'. The Aspen Institute. Retrieved October 16, 2009.
- ^Atlantic Council. 'Board of Directors'. Atlantic Council.
- ^'Western Issues Aired'. The Washington Post. April 24, 1978.
The three-day 26th Bilderberg Meeting concluded at a secluded cluster of shingled buildings in what was once a farmer's field. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, Swedish Prime Minister Thorbjorrn Falldin, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and NATO Commander Alexander M. Haig Jr. were among 104 North American and European leaders at the conference.
- ^'Bilderberg 2011 list of participants'. BilderbergMeetings.org. Archived from the original on August 28, 2011. Retrieved August 24, 2011.
- ^'A Guide to the Bohemian Grove'. Vanity Fair. April 1, 2009. Retrieved April 18, 2009.
- ^'History of CFR – Council on Foreign Relations'. cfr.org. Retrieved October 16, 2009.
- ^Gaouette, Nicole. 'Henry A. Kissinger'. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved February 15, 2014.
- ^Day, Peter. 'The 30-year-old health sector billionaire'. BBC News: Business. Retrieved August 15, 2014.
- ^'One Woman's Drive to Upend Medical Testing'. The New Yorker. March 3, 2015. Retrieved March 3, 2015.
- ^'Theranos is getting rid of high-profile board members including Henry Kissinger and George Shultz'. Business Insider. December 1, 2016. Retrieved October 24, 2017.
- ^Bloomberg New Economy Advisory Board Retrieved July 23, 2019
Further reading
Biographies
- 1973. Graubard, Stephen Richards, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind. ISBN0-393-05481-0
- 1974. Kalb, Marvin L. and Kalb, Bernard, Kissinger, ISBN0-316-48221-8
- 1974. Schlafly, Phyllis, Kissinger on the Couch. Arlington House Publishers. ISBN0-87000-216-3
- 1983. Hersh, Seymour, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House, Summit Books. ISBN0-671-50688-9. (Awards: National Book Critics Circle, General Non-Fiction Award. Best Book of the Year: New York Times Book Review; Newsweek; San Francisco Chronicle)
- 1992. Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. ISBN978-0-671-66323-0online free to borrow
- 2004. Hanhimäki, Jussi. The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. ISBN0-19-517221-3
- 2009. Kurz, Evi. The Kissinger-Saga – Walter and Henry Kissinger. Two Brothers from Fuerth, Germany. London. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN978-0-297-85675-7.
- 2015. Ferguson, Niall (2015). Kissinger, 1923–1968: The Idealist. New York: Penguin Books. ISBN9781594206535.
Other
- Avner, Yehuda, The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership, 2010. ISBN978-1-59264-278-6
- Bass, Gary. The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide, 2013. ISBN03077002080
ISBN88-8163-391-4
Kissinger Diplomacy Summary
- Berman, Larry, No peace, no honor. Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, New York: Free Press, 2001. ISBN0-684-84968-2.
- Dallek, Robert, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. HarperCollins, 2007. ISBN0-06-072230-4
- Grandin, Greg, Kissinger's Shadow: The Long Reach of America's Most Controversial Statesman. Metropolitan Books, 2015. ISBN978-1627794497
- Hanhimäki, Jussi M., 'Dr. Kissinger' or 'Mr. Henry'? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting', in: Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, Issue 5, pp. 637–76.
- Hanhimäki, Jussi. The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (2004) online
- Hitchens, Christopher, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, 2002. ISBN1-85984-631-9
- Klitzing, Holger, The Nemesis of Stability. Henry A. Kissinger's Ambivalent Relationship with Germany. Trier: WVT 2007, ISBN3-88476-942-1
- Mohan, Shannon E. 'Memorandum for Mr. Bundy': Henry Kissinger as Consultant to the Kennedy National Security Council,' Historian, 71,2 (2009), 234–257.
- Morris, Roger, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. Harper and Row, ISBN0-06-013097-0
- Qureshi, Lubna Z. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile.Lexington Books, 2009. ISBN0739126563
- Schmidt, Helmut, On Men and Power: A Political Memoir. 1990. ISBN0-224-02715-8
- Schulzinger, Robert D. Henry Kissinger. Doctor of Diplomacy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. ISBN0-231-06952-9
- Shawcross, William, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia (Revised edition October 2002) ISBN0-8154-1224-X.
- Suri, Jeremi, Henry Kissinger and the American Century (Harvard, Belknap Press, 2007), ISBN978-0-674-02579-0.
- Thornton, Richard C. The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping America's Foreign Policy (2001) online
- Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China, 2005. ISBN978-0-231-13565-8
External links
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- Official website
- Henry Kissinger on IMDb
- Appearances on C-SPAN
- Membership at the Council on Foreign Relations
Political offices | ||
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Preceded by Walt Rostow | National Security Advisor 1969–1975 | Succeeded by Brent Scowcroft |
Preceded by William Rogers | United States Secretary of State 1973–1977 | Succeeded by Cyrus Vance |
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